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ABSTRACT 
 
In a recent study by Sellers and Arrigo (2009), the researchers questioned whether 
the theory and method of a critically-animated psychological jurisprudence (PJ) could 
advance the ethical and justice policy dynamics of automatic adolescent waiver, given the 
literature on developmental maturity and adjudicative competence.  Situated within the law, 
psychology, and justice framework, the jurisprudential intent of the extant case law and the 
moral philosophy informing this intent were the source of qualitative scrutiny.  This paper 
follows a similar trajectory.  At issue is the relevant case law addressing Eighth Amendment 
challenges for persons with preexisting mental health conditions subjected to long-term 
disciplinary solitary confinement.  Guided by interpretive textual analysis, both the 
jurisprudential intent and the ethical reasoning that informs it are the source of legal 
exegeses.  Mindful of how insights derived from commonsense justice, therapeutic 
jurisprudence, and restorative justice promote the aims of PJ consistent with the philosophy 
of virtue ethics, this article speculatively and provisionally enumerates several policy 
recommendations.  These recommendations challenge psychologists of law, criminologists, Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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and other investigators to rethink judicial decision-making on the issue of long-term 
disciplinary solitary confinement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  Historically, education, training, and research in the law and psychology field have 
emerged from within one of the following three traditions: clinical; law and social science; 
and law, psychology, and justice (Arrigo, 2001; Arrigo & Fox, 2009).  While the clinical and 
law and social science perspectives emphasize evidence-based inquiry, the law, psychology, 
and justice framework is more deliberately theoretical in nature (e.g., Williams & Arrigo, 
2002). Admittedly, while the methods of each orientation ostensibly overlap, the law, 
psychology, and justice approach is distinct in that it advocates “social change and action 
through theory-sensitive psychological jurisprudence” (PJ) (Arrigo & Fox, 2009, p. 161; see 
also, Fox, 1993).  This broader and more critical conceptualization of the field guides the 
ensuing analysis.  
  Psychological jurisprudence fundamentally encompasses “theories that describe, 
explain, and predict law by reference to human behavior” (Small, 1993, p. 11).  As such, 
more than an empirical assessment concerning the process of judicial decision-making, PJ 
endeavors to inform judges and legislators about how they should make such 
determinations.  To accomplish this objective, PJ relies on pertinent data and prudent values 
that emphasize “not merely…what the law is but…what law ought to be” (Sellers & Arrigo, 
2009, p. 436; see also Arrigo, 2004; Arrigo & Fox, 2009; Darley et al., 2002; Melton, 
1992).  The assumption underlying this rationale is that the mental health and justice 
systems are, in essence, “totalizing apparatuses” that can engender harm (Arrigo, 2004, p. 
vii).  Thus, PJ‟s reformist agenda seeks to translate worthwhile theory into meaningful policy 
that can effectively address the distinct needs of offenders, victims, and the larger society 
to which both are bound.  This is how healing is promoted and justice is achieved (Arrigo, 
2002a; Fox, 1993; Ogloff, 2002).   Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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  Interestingly, several principles and practices at the law-psychology divide have 
surfaced in an effort to realize PJ‟s progressive change strategy.  Perhaps foremost among 
them are: 1) commonsense justice; 2) therapeutic jurisprudence; and 3) restorative justice.  
Collectively, these notions promote a quality of human social existence that, among other 
things, nurtures citizenship, communal well-being, and societal accord (Arrigo, 2004).  In 
what follows, how each doctrine embodies these values is summarily delineated.   
When determining matters of guilt or innocence, rather than relying on the 
“objective” nature of black-letter law (Finkel, 2001) commonsense justice draws attention to 
law‟s “subjective” dimensions (Huss et al., 2006; Finkel, 1997; Finkel, 2001).  In this 
respect, commonsense justice “reflects what ordinary people think is just and fair” and, 
ultimately, what they believe “the law ought to be” (Finkel, 2001, p. 2).  Thus, the legal, 
moral, and psychological reasoning employed by the everyday citizen rather than the 
prescriptive law should inform the decision-making process of jury members (Finkel, 2000), 
resulting in more organic, equitable, and harmonious outcomes.  Indeed, by advancing 
unfettered deliberation as proposed here, the law is perfected and made more complete 
(Finkel, 1995, p. 3).   
Therapeutic jurisprudence involves “the use of social science to study the extent to 
which a legal rule or practice promotes the psychological and physical well-being of the 
people it affects” (Schma et al., 2005, p. 60).  Proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence 
assert that the law, when informed by psychology, can be beneficial to parties in dispute 
such that it promotes healing rather than engenders harm (Wexler & Winick, 1996; Winick, 
1997; Winick & Wexler, 2006).  Given its deliberate salutary objective, therapeutic 
jurisprudence intends to preserve and/or to enhance the health-related needs of individuals 
through a reliance on legal institutions, programs, and practices (Glaser, 2003; McMahan & 
Wexler, 2003; Wexler, 2008).  Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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Restorative justice endeavors to cultivate a reparative climate among persons 
affected by harm typically arising from interpersonal violence (Braithwaite, 2006; Tyler, 
2006).  It assumes that the injury impacts not only the victim and offender, but the 
community in which the transgression occurred (Bazemore & Boba, 2007; Braithwaite, 
2006).  As such, restorative justice seeks to engage all aggrieved parties in candid and 
constructive dialogue. This dialogue is designed to meaningfully (re)connect disputants in 
such a way that transformative resolutions are reached and genuine responsibility and 
forgiveness prevail (Bazemore & Boba, 2007; Tyler, 2006; Umbreit et al., 2006).  Thus, the 
victim, the offender, and the community that joins both are, in essence, restored. 
As noted by Sellers and Arrigo (2009), “although not identified as such, these 
collective principles and practices [commonsense justice, therapeutic jurisprudence, and 
restorative justice] are consistent with virtue-based ethics” (p. 438).  Indeed, perhaps best 
articulated in Aristotle‟s treatise, Nichomachean Ethics (1998), virtue-based reasoning 
promotes the development of one‟s character in order to achieve what he termed 
eudaimonia (flourishing or excellence in being).  In contrast to other prevailing moral 
philosophies that endorse a weighing of competing interests or the preservation of a duty, 
virtue-based ethics suggests that one‟s moral fiber is not so much determined by what one 
does.  Instead, one must develop virtuous habits of character (Cahn, 2009; Williams & 
Arrigo, 2008).  To do so, Aristotle (1998) explained: 
“Anything that we have to learn to do we learn by the actual doing of it. People 
become builders by building and instrumentalists by playing instruments. Similarly, 
we become just by performing just acts, temperate by performing temperate ones, 
brave by performing braves ones” (p. 79). 
Ultimately then, by embodying virtue, “we make ourselves into the sorts of persons we truly 
want to be.  We make ourselves worthy of our own respect, lovable in our own eyes” 
(Leighton & Reiman, 2001, p. 12).   Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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A virtue-based response to crime or delinquency – in which each individual affected 
by the harm is encouraged to heal and subsequently to flourish – is most likely achieved 
through the PJ practices of commonsense justice, therapeutic jurisprudence, and restorative 
justice (Sellers & Arrigo, 2009).  Commonsense justice realizes this by allowing for the 
inclusion of felt regard in the process of courtroom decision-making.  Therapeutic 
jurisprudence succeeds at this by discerning where and how the law can act as a healing 
agent and, as a result, can produce beneficial outcomes.  Restorative justice accomplishes 
this by generating mutual empathy, compassion, and, ultimately, forgiveness among 
persons affected by injury.  As such, these three law-and-psychology practices advance the 
possibility for participants to experience authentic connections with one another, to share a 
common sense of responsibility, and to embrace redemption as a necessary condition that 
maximizes prospects for societal well-being, communal accord, and human flourishing. 
  Within the realm of law and psychology, one topic in which the logic of psychological 
jurisprudence and the philosophy of virtue-based ethics applies, is the imprisonment of 
mentally ill offenders.  Research overwhelmingly indicates that a significant number of those 
confined suffer from wide-ranging mental health problems (Baillargeon et al., 2009; Haney, 
2003; James & Glaze, 2006; Kupers, 1999; Lamb & Weinberger, 1998; Rhodes, 2004, 
2005).  Indeed, as Rhodes poignantly asserted, “increasingly punitive sentences combined 
with the deinstitutionalization of psychiatric treatment centers have resulted in correctional 
facilities becoming the „asylum of last resort‟ for the psychologically disordered” (2005, p. 
1693).   
In response to a burgeoning prison population – many of whom are mentally ill and 
arguably unable to conform their behavior to institutional rules and regulations – 
correctional administrators increasingly place incarcerates in solitary confinement.  Although 
some prison segregation units vary slightly depending on the jurisdiction, the facilities are 
typically designed to house inmates 23 hours a day in steel-door-enforced cells measuring Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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approximately 6 by 8 feet in size (Arrigo & Bullock, 2008).  One hour of exercise time a day 
is allowed for most segregated prisoners.  Often referred to as the “dog run[s],” the 
exercise pens in isolation units and facililities are surrounded by concrete walls or are, 
essentially, a wire cage.  Thus, segregated incarcerates have little to no daily exposure to 
fresh air, natural light, or opportunity for physical health enhancing activities (Haney, 2003; 
Shalev, 2009).  To limit interaction with others, some facilities employ “tele-psychiatry” and 
“tele-medicine” procedures in which the prisoner may only be “examined” through video 
conferencing with medical and mental health professionals and staff (Haney, 2003, p. 126; 
see also Shalev, 2009).  In addition to imposed seclusion, mechanical, physical, chemical, 
and technological restraints are utilized to ensure minimal psychological stimulation and to 
control nearly every aspect of an inmate‟s existence (Haney, 2003; Kupers, 2008; Toch, 
2003).   
Although the mental health of prisoners in isolative confinement is monitored 
according to policies delineated in each penal setting, the extreme solitude to which 
incarcerates are subjected raises a number of thorny ethical questions.  Research, dating 
back as far as the mid-nineteenth century, delineates the deleterious effects of solitary 
confinement on prisoners‟ mental health (Grassian, 1983; Haney, 2003; Kupers, 2008; 
Mears, 2006; Rhodes, 2004, 2005; Toch, 2003).  Indeed, as Haney observed, “there are 
few if any forms of imprisonment that appear to produce so much psychological trauma and 
in which so many symptoms of psychopathology are manifested”  (2003, p. 126).   
According to the extant literature, isolation of varying types and durations negatively 
impacts the mental health of incarcerates with no known psychiatric disorders.  However, 
the effects of placing inmates with preexisting mental health conditions in solitary 
confinement, particularly in extreme isolative conditions and for protracted periods of time, 
are especially devastating.  Moreover, research suggests that mentally ill inmates are 
significantly more likely to be placed in segregation and supermax facilities (Haney, 2003; Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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Kurki & Morris, 2001; Toch, 2001; see also Mears & Watson, 2006).  Indeed, psychiatrically 
disordered prisoners “are more likely…to break prison rules, engage in arguments with other 
inmates, and decompensate mentally” (Naday et al, 2008, p. 87; see also, Haney, 2003; 
Rhodes, 2004).  Thus, given the frequency with which mentally ill inmates are placed in 
isolation and noting the gravity of the associated risks, the focus of the ensuing inquiry is on 
psychiatrically disordered inmates in prolonged disciplinary solitary confinement.   
Regretablly, the legal community has yet to incorporate the extant social and 
behavioral science findings on mentally ill incarcerates in protracted punitive segregation 
into the relevant case law on cruel and unusual punishment matters.  Moreover, no study 
has yet to purposefully explore the essential ethical rationale that informs the courts‟ 
decision-making.  This obtains especially when Eighth Amendment challenges proffered by 
prisoners in long-term disciplinary isolation who suffer from preexisting mental health 
conditions are the source of inquiry.  In other words, the logic of psychological 
jurisprudence and the philosophy of ethics conveyed through the pertinent case opinions on 
the subject of punitive segregation and mentally disordered inmates have not been 
systematically examined.
1  A thorough analysis of both may very well be the basis for 
converting (tacit) theory into constructive public policy.   
The following qualitative study focuses on these critical issues.  Specifically, the 
moral philosophy discernable in the judicial opinions that communicates the courts‟ 
perspective on Eighth Amendment challenges raised by inmates with preexisting mental 
health conditions placed in long-term disciplinary solitary confinement will be made clear.  
Addressing this matter then makes it possible to evaluate whether, and to what extent, 
current punitive isolation practices impacting psychiatrically disordered incarcerates support 
(or fail to support) excellence in being for all participants in which the merits “of living 
virtuously [inform] the jurisprudential reasoning” (Sellers & Arrigo, 2009, p. 441). Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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Accordingly, Section one outlines the distinct types of solitary confinement, recounts 
the relevant literature on inmate mental health in both the general prison population and 
while in isolation, and describes the prevailing approaches to ethics.  Section two delineates 
the qualitative methodology employed in this study.  This includes the procedures followed 
that led to the selection of those court cases constituting the data set, and a description of 
the two levels of textual exegeses in which each case was analyzed.  Section three presents 
the results, including the moral logic located within the jurisprudential reasoning for each 
judicial opinion and among all of the court decisions.  Section four specifies a number of 
implications that emerge from the study‟s findings.  Along these lines, several key 
recommendations are provisionally and tentatively enumerated based on commonsense 
justice, therapeutic jurisprudence, and restorative justice practices.  These observations 
address whether the moral philosophy underlying long-term punitive isolation as endorsed 
by the legal apparatus is suspect or flawed, mindful of existing law and psychology 
strategies that promote virtue-driven solutions to the problems posed by delinquency and 
crime.
2    
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Types of Solitary Confinement:  An Overview 
Although solitary confinement facilities are designed to physically isolate and 
constructively curtail the violent behavior of disruptive inmates, there are variations in the 
types and length of imprisonment.  Segregation facilities and units are known by a number 
of names, including extended control units (ECUs) and secured housing units (SHUs) 
(Haney, 2003).  While the names of the units may differ, the facilities share a number of 
psychological characteristics that often make the conditions within them indistinguishable 
from one another (Haney, 2003; see also Riveland, 1999).  Indeed, what constitutes short-
term and long-term administrative and disciplinary solitary confinement also varies Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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according to individual correctional institutions and their respective jurisdictions.  Moreover, 
the degree of isolation imposed within each unit is not uniformally representative of every 
solitary confinement facility (Haney, 2003; Rhodes, 2004; Mears & Watson, 2006; Naday et 
al., 2008).  Noting these definitional and generalization concerns, the ensuing discussion 
focuses on the research findings delineating the conditions of the two types of solitary 
confinement as they are formally designated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and 
recognized within the prevailing literature.    
Administrative segregation (Ad-Seg) is one type of solitary confinement.  As noted, 
the conditions under which inmates are placed in Ad-Seg vary slightly depending on the 
jurisdiction; however, many inmates are placed in this type of isolation based on a pending 
investigation of a rule infraction or a possible transfer to disciplinary segregation.  According 
to Riveland, “inmates who have demonstrated that they are chronically violent or assaultive, 
who present a serious escape risk, or who have demonstrated a capacity to incite 
disturbances or otherwise are threatening the orderly operation of the [institution‟s] general 
population may become target populations”  (1999, p. 6). 
Conditions in administrative segregation are restrictive.  However, in addition to 
basic necessities such as hygiene products and an hour of physical activity time, Ad-Seg 
incarcerates may also receive literary materials and mail.  These and other items are often 
contingent upon the behavior of the inmate while in Ad-Seg.  If the incarcerate is 
uncooperative or disruptive, these privileges can be removed (Federal Bureau of Prisons 
Guidelines, 2008; O‟Keefe, 2008).   
Perhaps one of the greatest concerns regarding administrative segregation is that an 
inmate may be placed there indefinitely.  In fact, the typical stay of an inmate in Ad-Seg 
may exceed the average stay of an individual in disciplinary segregation.  Placement in this 
type of solitary confinement relies solely on the discretion of correctional administrators and 
staff.   As such, there is no formally imposed due process procedure that precedes Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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administrative isolation.  Consequently, human rights advocates have raised concerns 
regarding prisoners in Ad-Seg receiving a “punishment disproportionate to the seriousness 
of the behavior” (O‟Keefe, 2008, p. 126). 
The second type of solitary confinement is disciplinary or punitive segregation.  
Unlike its administrative counterpoint, punitive isolation: “is a time-limited response to a 
disciplinary infraction after due process hearings resulting in a finding of guilt” (O‟Keefe, 
2008, p. 124).  According to the Federal BOP, a designated Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO) 
is required to consider an inmate‟s violation of prison rules.  If the DHO determines that no 
other “course of action will adequately punish the inmate or deter her or him from violating 
BOP rules again,” then the DHO may order the inmate to be placed in disciplinary 
segregation  (Federal Bureau of Prisons Guidelines, 2008, p.1). 
Depending on the jurisdiction in which the correctional facility is operating, 
incarcerates placed in disciplinary segregation may only spend months in punitive solitude 
(Arrigo & Bullock, 2008; O‟Keefe, 2008).  However, if an inmate repeatedly violates BOP 
rules while in isolation, their period of segregation can extend to years (Kupers, 1999; 
2008; Rhodes, 2004).  Regardless of the length of confinement, the conditions of punitive 
isolation are intended to be extremely restrictive.  While disciplinary segregation is 
considered by some to be excessively harsh, the BOP requires prison administrators and 
staff to ensure that inmates in said confinement receive “the basic living levels of decency 
and humane treatment” (Federal Bureau of Prisons Guidelines, 2008, p. 2).  Moreover, the 
guidelines require that inmates‟ fundamental needs, such as a nutritionally adequate meals 
and access to a toilet, must be met (Federal Bureau of Prisons Guidelines, 2008). 
 
Research on Imprisonment, Inmate Mental Health, and Solitary Confinement 
  Before considering the extant literature on solitary confinement, it is imperative to 
examine the prevalence of mental health problems within penal institutions.  Reflective of Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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the current trend toward increasingly punitive sentences and overburdened psychiatric care 
resources, correctional facilities have quickly become a crude haven of sorts for the 
psychologically disordered (Rhodes, 2005).  For example, a study published by the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics indicated that well over half of all prisoners suffer from a mental illness.  
In terms of percentages, 56% of State prisoners, 45% of Federal prisoners, and 64% of jail 
incarcerates are estimated to have a psychological health problem (James & Glaze, 2006).   
To conduct the study, researchers utilized two measures for determining such 
problems. These measures included a history of mental health issues within the past 12 
months or the presence of symptoms as delineated by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR).  Among the mental health concerns reported, major 
depression and mania were the most common.  Perhaps unsurprising given the often 
volatile environment of correctional facilities, persistent anger and insomnia or hypersomnia 
were the most frequently reported symptoms.  Only a small percentage of inmates indicated 
that they had attempted suicide in the last 12 months.  Nearly a quarter of all jailed inmates 
(24%) had symptoms of a psychotic disorder.  Among those in prison, 15% of State 
inmates and 10% of Federal inmates indicated that they had experienced at least one 
psychotic symptom (James & Glaze, 2006).  Additional studies exploring various 
associations between mental illness and incarceration report similar findings (Abramsky & 
Fellner, 1999; Baillargeon et al., 2009; Haney, 2003; Kupers, 1999; Lamb & Weinberger, 
1998; Rhodes, 2004, 2005). 
  At the present time, the approximate number of prisoners serving time in solitary 
confinement is regrettably imprecise.  Definitional concerns coupled with the unwillingness 
of penal institutions to allow access to isolated prisoners have presented a challenge for 
researchers attempting to reach an accurate figure.  While published reports estimate that 
between 5,000 to 100,000 incarcerates are serving time in supermax facilities, “the most 
frequently cited figure in the past 6 years is 20,000” (Naday et al., 2008, p. 77; see also Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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Haney, 2003; Mears & Watson, 2006; Pizarro & Stenius, 2004).  Although this number has 
been referenced throughout much of the current literature, the estimate was obtained from 
two reports compiled in the 1990s using dated findings; thus, it fails to provide an accurate 
account (Naday et al., 2008).   
Among segregated inmates, the estimate of those with a preexisting mental health 
condition is perhaps slightly more clear.  Current findings indicate that nearly a third (29%) 
have been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder (Haney, 2003; Lovell, 2008; Lovell et al., 
2000).  However, most researchers contend that the number of mentally ill incarcerates 
may be far greater.  According to Kupers, “correctional mental health clinicians, on average, 
and without thinking about it in precisely this way, respond to the fact [that] there is such a 
large number of prisoners with mental illness they cannot treat by under-diagnosing mental 
illness in the prisoners they see”  (2008, p. 1008).  He claimed that there are significant 
numbers of segregated incarcerates who either receive no treatment or rotate between 
being placed in observation and segregation.  As a psychiatric expert in litigation, Kupers 
provided a stark look at the forlorn plight of many mentally ill inmates in segregation: 
“Often, after performing a chart review and briefly interviewing a prisoner in a 
supermaximum unit, I conclude that he suffers from schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, 
or recurrent major depressive disorder.  For example, the individual may have been 
hospitalized two or three times in the community…may have been awarded Social 
Security Total Disability…and he may have been prescribed antipsychotic medications 
with good effect.  Yet when I look further in the chart, I discover that…he has been 
given a diagnosis of “no mental illness on Axis I” (2008, p.1008). 
Errors, from both the well-meaning and the beleaguered correctional psychiatric 
practitioner, significantly compromise the treatment that segregated prisoners with 
preexisting mental health conditions receive  (Baillargeon et al., 2009; Kupers, 2008). Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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Although correctional psychiatric practitioners play a role in how incarcerates cope 
with solitary confinement, it is crucial to consider how the condition and duration of 
segregation impacts prisoners.  The extant literature on solitary confinement and its 
deleterious effects is, in part, ambiguous.  As previously mentioned, administrative and 
disciplinary segregation include long and short timeframes.  Depending on the jurisdiction of 
the particular correctional facility, Ad-Seg inmates may spend longer periods in isolation, 
but those in punitive segregation often live in far more restrictive conditions.  Nevertheless, 
what is consistently borne out in the research is that prisoner isolation – particularly for long 
periods of time and under harsh conditions – is harmful to the incarcerate‟s mental well-
being (Arrigo & Bullock, 2008; Grassian, 1983; Haney, 2003; Haney & Lynch, 1997; Pizarro 
& Stenius, 2004; Toch, 2001, 2003).
3  In what follows, the conditions and duration of 
isolation – as well as their impact on mental health – are discussed. 
 
Mental health concerns and administrative segregation 
Studies involving contemporary data on prolonged solitary confinement support early 
empirical evidence documenting the debilitating mental health effects of this penal practice 
(Toch, 2003).  However, the current research specifically investigating the psychological 
consequences of administrative segregation is scant, particularly in regard to short-term 
isolation.  Although widely used in correctional institutions throughout the United States, the 
literature exploring this form of isolation and its duration has mostly been conducted 
internationally.  To illustrate, researchers in Canada have undertaken a number of studies 
with inmates isolated for periods varying from 7 to 60 days, and they have found little to no 
harmful effects on incarcerates‟ psychological well-being  (Bonta & Gendreau, 1995; 
Ecclestone, Gendreau, & Knox, 1974; Gendreau et al., 1972; Gendreau & Bonta, 1984; 
Zinger et al., 2001).  However, the ability to generalize these findings to all Ad-Seg Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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inmates, particularly those in the United States, is spurious at best (Arrigo & Bullock, 2008; 
O‟Keefe, 2008; Zinger & Wichmann, 1999).     
In the early 1980s, Dr. Grassian of Harvard Medical School conducted a study to 
determine the effects of extended periods of administrative segregation on incarcerates.  
Grassian found that inmates in administrative isolation suffered from a notable decline in 
mental health.  Specifically, the inmates exhibited the following symptoms:  “massive free-
floating anxiety, hyper-responsivity to external stimuli, perceptual disillusions, 
hallucinations, derealization experiences, difficulties with thinking, concentration, memory, 
acute confusional states, aggressive fantasies, and paranoia”  (Grassian, 1983, pp. 1452-
1453).   
 
Mental health concerns and disciplinary segregation 
  As noted previously, the psychological impact of short-term isolation remains 
empirically undetermined.  Thus, the deleterious effects of punitive segregation, especially 
for a brief period, have yet to be adequately examined.  However, similar to the research on 
long-term administrative segregation, the extant literature on long-term disciplinary 
segregation overwhelmingly indicates that such isolation affects the mental well-being of 
prisoners.
4  
Haney‟s study of 100 prisoners located at California‟s Pelican Bay supermax facility 
offers compelling insight into the living conditions of those housed in prolonged punitive 
isolation.  As he explained, inmates in solitary confinement: 
“…can  live  for  many  years  separated  from  the  natural  world  around  them  and 
removed from the natural rhythms of social life, are denied access to vocational or 
education training programs or other activities in which to engage, get out of their 
cells no more than a few hours a week, are under virtually constant surveillance and 
monitoring, are rarely if ever in the presence of another person without being heavily Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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chained  and  restrained,  having  no  opportunities  for  normal  conversation  or  social 
interaction  (Haney, 2003, p. 127). 
Indeed, at a U.S. Department of Health conference, Haney delineated the consequences of 
protracted solitary conditions as: 
“…an impaired sense of identity; hypersensitivity to stimuli; cognitive dysfunction 
(confusion, memory loss, ruminations); irritability, anger, aggression and/or rage; 
other directed violence, such as stabbings, attacks on staff, property destruction, 
and collective violence; lethargy, helplessness and hopelessness; chronic depression; 
self-mutilation and/or suicidal ideation, impulses, and control; hallucinations; 
psychosis and/or paranoia; overall deterioration of mental and physical health”  
(Haney as cited in Elsner, 2004, pp. 150-151). 
These symptoms have been found to be so common that researchers often refer to 
them collectively as “SHU Syndrome” (Haney, 2003).
5   In Haney‟s study, he discovered 
that a number of inmates exhibited patented signs of mental deterioration.  The symptoms 
commonly reported were heightened anxiety (91%), confused thought processes (84%), 
and hallucinations (41%).  In order to ameliorate the psychological effects of isolation, 
some inmates develop social pathologies.  Some of the behavioral adaptations include, 
difficulties exercising self-control, lack of self-efficacy, and a diminishing capacity to test 
reality  (Haney, 2003).
6 
Although suicide attempts are less common among inmates housed in the general 
population of jails and prisons than their isolated counterparts, some empirical evidence 
substantiates the argument that incarcerates subjected to long-term solitary confinement 
are more inclined to attempt suicide than any other imprisoned group.  As previously noted, 
Kupers cited the rotation of inmates from observation to segregation as the reason for the 
astonishing suicide rate among convicts placed in extended isolation.  Of all the inmates 
who commit suicide, “approximately half occur among the 6% to 8% of the prison Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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population that is consigned to segregation at any given time”  (Kupers, 2008, p. 1009).  
According to Way et al. (2005), 76 inmates housed in a New York solitary confinement 
facility committed suicide within a period of less than ten years.  Similarly, 70% of the 
inmates in the California correctional system who committed suicide over a one-year period 
were those confined to long-term solitary isolation (Mears, 2006). 
  In addition to suicide attempts, research indicates that a number of inmates placed 
in long-term solitary confinement engage in self-injurious behavior (Haney, 2003; Kilty, 
2006; Thomas et al., 2006).  Providing an account of self-harm among male inmates, 
Rhodes suggested that, “Cutting, near-hanging, self-mutilation and swallowing sharp 
objects appear as bodily enactments of emotional pain that teeter at the brink of suicide  
(as cited in Thomas et al., 2006, p.196).  Although self-harm has typically been considered 
an individual pathology, some researchers assert that it is a way for prisoners to cope with 
the unremitting and unbearable conditions of isolated confinement (Kilty, 2006; Thomas et 
al., 2006).  According to Thomas and his colleagues, “In this view, self-injurious behavior 
becomes symptomatic not only of individual mental health, but of the pathology of prisons 
as well” (2006, p. 197).      
  In response, correctional administrators and officers typically seek to control and 
punish individuals who exhibit self-destructive behaviors (Kilty 2006; Thomas et al., 2006).  
Because the inmate is in state custody, self-injurious behavior is treated as “destruction of 
state property,-to wit, the prisoner‟s body” (Fellner, 2006, p. 397).  Further, because 
correctional workers fail to recognize that the conditions of the solitary environment may be 
a causal factor in self-injurious conduct, correctional facilities tend to “retain a myopic thrust 
that may in fact encourage such behaviors”  (Thomas et al., 2006, p. 194).  Thus, the 
segregated incarcerate is once again consumed in a cycle of behavior that ensures and 
extends their placement in long-term punitive isolation.  Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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  While the empirical findings on solitary confinement and their harmful effects are 
growing, the current research also includes a number of methodological weaknesses.  As 
noted previously, a “lack of consensus” regarding how solitary confinement and supermax 
facilities are defined and classified presents a number of challenges for investigators seeking 
to accurately determine the number of inmates in isolation and to systematically examine 
the conditions of segregation (Naday et al., 2008, p. 73).  Indeed, according to Mears and 
Watson (2006), the very nature of isolation precludes investigators from gaining meaningful 
access to those whom they seek to study.  Interestingly, as Toch noted, the early studies on 
solitary confinement were unique in that they involved both “formal experimentation and 
the collection of evaluative data” (Toch, 2003, p. 221).  However, since that time, few 
inquiries have utilized robust methods to determine the deleterious effects of short and 
long-term administrative and disciplinary solitary confinement on incarcerates with 
preexisting mental health conditions. 
 
Approaches to Ethics 
  As a form of retribution, the punitive use of solitary confinement raises a number of 
profound moral and ethical questions.  Within the extant literature, three distinct 
approaches to ethics are germane to the present inquiry.  These moral philosophies include 
consequentialism, formalism, and virtue-based moral reasoning.  In the discussion that 
follows, the principles of each ethical approach are succinctly delineated.  In addition to a 
fundamental review of these approaches, applications in the appropriate criminal justice 
contexts are suggestively mentioned, especially where relevant to the ensuing empirical 
analysis.  
  Among the aforementioned moral philosophies, consequentialism is perhaps one of 
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most important.  Consequentialism claims that, “what makes an act morally right or wrong 
is its consequences and nothing more” (Banks, 2008, p. 299).  As such, the motive for and 
nature of an individual‟s act is not considered.  Within this school of moral thought, there 
are three forms:  ethical egoism, contractualism, and utilitarianism (Cahn, 2009; Williams & 
Arrigo, 2008). 
Ethical egoism asserts that “promoting one‟s own greater good is always to act in 
accordance with reason and morality” (Baier, 1991 as cited in Banks, 2008, p. 338).  Based 
on the notion of how we ought to behave, ethical egoism proposes that an individual acts in 
a manner that will satisfy one‟s self-interest.  Although our behavior may benefit the 
interests of others, ethical egoism implies that we have no obligation to be mindful of those 
interests (Banks, 2008; Cahn, 2009).  As Thomas Hobbes, a psychological and ethical 
egoist, described in Leviathan: 
“…every man is enemy to every man…wherein men live without other security, than 
what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish…there is no place for 
industry… no culture of the earth… no navigation… no knowledge…no account of 
time…no arts…no letters…no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and 
danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” 
(1996, p. 89). 
Hobbes and other ethical egoists propose a society in which individuals are divided into 
groups.  Among these groups, the interests of one group supersede the interests of the 
other groups.  Although the division may be arbitrary, ethical egoism requires attention only 
to that which will further one‟s self-interest (Banks, 2008; Cahn, 2009).   
  While egoism promotes a society in which individuals are motivated solely by self-
interest, maintaining a sense of harmony and security remain a concern.  To achieve these 
ends, Hobbes asserted that two guarantees are necessary:  a guarantee “that people will 
not harm one another” and a guarantee that people will “rely on one another to keep their Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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agreements” (Williams & Arrigo, 2008, pp. 192-193).  These guarantees involve 
contractualism, or as it is more commonly known, social contract theory.  Social contract 
theory supports the notion that some form of an established government must be in place 
in order to ensure that these promises are upheld.  In other words, the existence of the 
State is essential. The State helps to maintain a society in which the citizenry‟s most 
pertinent rules are enforced.  The social contract not only legitimizes the need for the State, 
but also the need for State functions such as law enforcement (Sterba, 2003; Williams & 
Arrigo, 2008).  According to philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, an advocate of 
contractualism, “the existence of the [S]tate allows us to become fundamentally different 
types of people” (Williams & Arrigo, 2008, p. 193).  Because the State creates a set of 
moral rules that provide individuals with the sense of security and welfare that they 
inherently desire, they are able to genuinely and mutually care about one another (Sterba, 
2003). 
Utilitarianism “holds that actions are morally right so far as they have beneficial 
consequences” (Williams & Arrigo, 2008, pp. 105-196).  While ethical egoism proposes that 
one‟s sole concern should be self-interest, utilitarianism requires one to consider how their 
actions will affect others.  Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, both classical utilitarian 
theorists, promoted the “principle of utility” (Bentham & Mill, 1973; Cahn, 2009).  Later 
termed the “Greatest Happiness Principle” by Mill, the principle sought to establish that 
what is right and good is what creates the greatest happiness for all individuals affected 
(Banks, 2008, p. 299; Mill, 1957, pp. 15-16).  Based on this principle, social policies should 
produce the most positive results for those whom the policies impact (Banks, 2008).  
However, Mill asserted that such strategies should be informed by empirical inquiry.  That 
is, lawmakers must acquire the knowledge and empirical evidence necessary in order to 
accurately determine the consequences of their policymaking decisions (Mill, 1957). Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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Formalism is another school of moral philosophy discernable in the extant literature.  
Rather than focusing on the consequences of moral choices, formalism asserts that one 
must be mindful of moral duties.  Often termed deontological ethics, this approach “shifts 
attention away from the effects of our actions, placing the focus squarely on the actions 
themselves” (Williams & Arrigo, 2008, p. 216).  Within the formalist tradition, there are two 
schools of thought pertinent to the current inquiry:  Kantian ethics and prima facie duties 
(Williams & Arrigo, 2008). 
Perhaps one of the most influential philosophers to contribute to Western moral 
thought is Immanuel Kant.  According to Kant, there are “absolute moral rules” to which 
one must adhere, regardless of potentially adverse consequences (Williams & Arrigo, 2008, 
p. 217).   However, Kant also asserted that one may not justify utilizing another individual 
as a means to an end (Cahn, 2009; Kant, 2002; Mossman, 2006).  He also asserted that 
“all human beings have intrinsic worth or dignity”  (Williams & Arrigo, 2008, p. 223).  In 
regard to punishment, Kant believed that it “can never be administered merely as a means 
for promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but 
must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has 
committed a crime”  (Shichor, 2006, p. 26). 
However, there is one concern with Kant‟s ethical approach.  The approach fails to 
instruct individuals on how to reconcile conflicting moral duties.  To address this 
predicament, W.D. Ross developed the ethics of prima facie duties.  While Kant‟s duties are 
based on absolutes, Ross‟ notion of duties is conditional.  That is, “certain duties can and 
should be violated if, given the situational factors in play, we determine that other duties 
override them” (Williams & Arrigo, 2008, p. 227).   
Unlike the consequentialist and formalist concerns with how to behave in a moral 
manner, virtue ethics is concerned with how we must morally evolve to cultivate an ethics-
based life.  Based on Aristotle‟s, Nicomachean Ethics, virtue ethics emphasizes developing Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
Special Edition Vol 1, Nov, 2010: pp. 1-82                     Bersot & Arrigo 
 
22 
 
one‟s moral character as opposed to speculating about consequences or upholding duties 
(Aristotle, 1998; Cahn, 2009).  Aristotle asserted that, “when we develop as we “ought,” we 
live well, thrive, and flourish, and when we do not, we suffer and decay” (Darwall, 1998, p. 
195).  In order to flourish, we must interact with others.  According to Aristotle, humans are 
“naturally social” (Perl et al., 2006, p. 214).  Indeed, he believed that individuals are not 
meant to live a solitary life.  Aristotle argued that, “man is born for citizenship” (Perl et al., 
2006, p. 215). 
By consistently engaging in virtuous activity, one realizes one‟s own happiness.  
Aware of often conflicting situations, Aristotle proposed that individuals “find the mean” 
between two extremes.  In other words, one must thoroughly consider the facts of a given 
situation, mindful of growing the excellence of one‟s character.  Thus, for example, between 
the excess vice (e.g., foolhardiness) and the deficiency vice (e.g., cowardice) is the “golden 
mean” or virtue (e.g., courage) that provides us with the knowledge necessary to act in an 
ethical manner (Banks, 2008, p. 320). 
 
METHOD 
This study examines the underlying ethical thought in the extant case law 
concerning: (a) prisoners placed in long-term, disciplinary solitary confinement
7 ; (b) with 
preexisting mental health conditions; (c) where the Eighth Amendment‟s prohibition on 
cruel and unusual punishment is at issue.  The moral philosophy discerned from the judicial 
decisions will focus on the ethical principles, and corresponding rationale, that both guide 
and influence the courts‟ interpretations, analyses, and judgments (Hogg et al., 2007; Paul 
& Elder, 2006).  This perspective does not imply that jurists who engage in case 
review, commentary, and subsequent decision-making are legally required to 
deliberate mindful of a particular ethic (e.g., utilitarianism).  On the contrary, the 
method systematically exposes the underlying ethical reasoning lodged within a Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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given case.  Thus, to access this core moral philosophy, the jurisprudential intent of the 
courts‟ rulings will first be identified.  In order to carefully review the courts‟ intent or 
decision-making rhetoric, the “judicial construction of the opinion” necessitates close 
textual scrutiny (Arrigo, 2003, p. 59; see also Sellers & Arrigo, 2009).  A review of these 
legally constructed narratives, then, makes it possible to ascertain the plain meaning of the 
courts‟ rulings (Arrigo, 2003; Hogg et al., 2007).  This is meaning that reflects 
jurisprudential intent (Sellers & Arrigo, 2009).
8 
In the context of legal analysis, the relationship between jurisprudential intent and 
the moral philosophy that informs it represents a qualitative inquiry.  Following the law-
psychology-justice method first utilized by Sellers and Arrigo (2009), this investigation 
employs both an intra-textual (within one case) and inter-textual (between multiple cases) 
evaluation of the judicial decisions themselves.  As some researchers have suggested, the 
interpretive nature of this undertaking reveals “how and for whom justice is served” (Arrigo, 
2003, p. 55).  However, before commenting further on the qualitative nature of this project, 
it is important to delineate the criteria used to determine which court decisions warranted 
textual examination.   
The data set of relevant cases was complied through a LexisNexis search.  The 
search terms included “long-term,” “disciplinary,” “solitary confinement,” “mental illness,” 
“Eighth Amendment” and “cruel and unusual punishment.”  The constructs “long-term” and 
“disciplinary” were deemed essential.  Mindful of the prevailing literature chronicling the 
harmful effects of solitary confinement and the relevance of this research for the ensuing 
study, both terms fundamentally signify the worst case scenario for psychiatrically 
disordered offenders as delineated by the BOP.  Admittedly, the length of time constituting 
“long-term” varies according to institution-specfic standards and practices. However, the 
phrase was selected in order to yield only those cases involving prisoners subjected to a 
protracted period of confinement as defined by the penal facility.   Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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As noted previously, administrative and disciplinary segregation are often indistinct 
when categorized psychologically.  However, the term “disciplinary” was chosen solely 
based on how this type of solitary confinement is identified by the respective jurisdiction 
and correctional facility.  Moreover, a preliminary exploration undertaken without these 
specific parameters yielded a substantial number of cases involving both long and short-
term administrative and disciplinary solitary confinement.  The attention to short and long-
term administrative segregation is not pertinent to the present inquiry.   
Use of the search term “punitive” rather than or in addition to “disciplinary” was also 
considered.  However, the latter construct more accurately yielded cases involving the 
specific type of confinement concerns germane to the ensuing exploration.  “Solitary 
confinement” was chosen over “segregation.”  The latter construct is not exclusively used by 
jurisdictions to identify conditions consistent with extreme isolation; thus, it produced a 
considerable number of cases involving: (1) forms of separation (e.g., in housing, 
education); and (2) various types of seclusion tactics employed in correctional facilities 
(e.g., restrictions on reading material).  These issues are not relevant to this study.   
Phrases such as “mental health” and “mental health condition” combined with the 
other established search terms produced too few case law results (N = 2); thus, these 
terms were not considered useful.  A search was also executed utilizing the word 
“preexisting.”  However, its inclusion did not increase the number of relevant cases.  Mindful 
of these collective results, the term “mental illness” was included.  This ensured that all 
cases involving individuals with psychological disorders, particularly those with recognized 
diagnoses, would be incorporated into the analysis.  The phrases “Eighth Amendment” and 
“cruel and unusual punishment” were included, given the present inquiry‟s obvious focus on 
solitary confinement conditions that potentially inflict a particularly atypical and harsh 
penalty on prisoners.
9  Accordingly, based on these search term criteria, the LexisNexis 
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The preliminary search regarding the extant case law was undertaken in an effort to 
identify all precedent-setting decisions.  These include court rulings that establish a 
standard for subsequent judicial deliberations addressing Eighth Amendment challenges 
involving prolonged punitive segregation and inmates with psychological disorders.  Thus, 
initial focus was directed toward opinions rendered by the United States Supreme Court.  
The social science and legal literature point to decisions, such as Farmer v. Brennan (1994) 
and Rhodes v. Chapman (1981), that have guided the courts‟ rule-making on issues related 
to harsh conditions in segregation (Harvard Law Review, 2008; Perlin & Dlugacz, 2008; 
Weidman, 2004).
10  However, the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case that meets the 
specific parameters established for the ensuing inquiry.
11  As such, an exploration of the 
current state of this correctional law entailed a critical examination of district and appellate 
court cases identified through the previously articulated LexisNexis search. 
A cursory review of these twenty cases revealed that a number of them discussed 
long-term segregation and mental illness.  However, in these instances, administrative 
confinement was at issue.  Thus, the second step in the process was to discern which 
judicial opinions dealt exclusively with disciplinary confinement.  Among the court rulings 
initially identified through the LexisNexis search, four cases were eliminated given their 
clear focus on administrative segregation or some other form of non-punitive confinement.  
These decisions included:  Adnan v. Santa Clara County Department of Corrections (2002), 
Ruiz v. Estelle (1980), Giano v. Kelly (2000), and Pearson v. Fair (1989).  Rennie v. Klein 
(1981) was removed from the data set, as the case involved treatment within a civil 
psychiatric hospital.  A sixth case, Ruiz v. Johnson (1999), was also excluded.  This judicial 
ruling is often cited in the extant social science and law review literature as a landmark 
decision in which the court considered the deleterious effects of long-term administrative 
segregation on prisoners with preexisting mental health conditions (Fellner, 2006; Haney, 
2003; Harvard Law Review, 2008; Perlin & Dlugacz, 2008).  The inmates in this case sought Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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protection under the Eighth Amendment‟s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
based on the conditions of the Ad-Seg unit in which they were confined.
12 
 After excluding judicial decisions that did not involve disciplinary solitary 
confinement, the next step was to determine which of the remaining cases involved 
prisoners raising Eighth Amendment challenges based on the claim that the confinement 
itself exacerbated a preexisting mental health condition.  Clearly, several judicial rulings 
considered mental health issues that relate to long-term punitive segregation.  These cases 
include: Tillery v. Owens (1989), Dawson v. Kindrick (1981), Laaman v. Helgemoe (1977), 
Kane v. Winn (2004), Davenport v. DeRobertis (1987), and Dantzler v. Beard (2007).  
However, in each instance, prisoners did not assert that they suffered from a previously 
diagnosed psychological disorder.  As such, these court opinions were removed from the 
data set. 
The next matter was to determine if the remaining eight court cases were 
appropriate for textual analysis. Comer v. Stewart (2002) involved a prisoner exhibiting 
symptoms of SHU syndrome after being confined in disciplinary segregation.  However, in 
this case, the court considered whether Comer‟s claim of suffering from SHU syndrome 
affected his competency to waive his right to habeas appeal.  Thus, the case was 
eliminated.  Coleman v. Wilson (1994) explored the conditions within the solitary 
confinement unit at Pelican Bay State Prison. However, the court‟s deliberation chiefly 
focused on inadequate mental health care throughout the California correctional system.  As 
such, Coleman v. Wilson (1994) was excluded. 
In Farmer v. Kavanagh (2007), an inmate sought protection from cruel and unusual 
punishment after being placed in solitary confinement at a supermax facility.  Farmer, who 
suffered from a number of physical ailments and psychological disorders, argued that the 
conditions of his confinement worsened his mental health problems.  While the court 
acknowledged his Eighth Amendment claim, the court focused on Farmer‟s assertion of a Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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due process violation based on a sudden transfer to the supermax segregation unit.  As 
such, Farmer was deemed not suitable for critical examination.   
Redden v. Ricci (2008) was considered for review, but it was eventually eliminated.  
The case met each investigatory parameter, with one exception.  While the Eighth 
Amendment challenge was raised in part because of the inmate‟s time in disciplinary 
segregation, the duration of confinement was only 15 days.  Furthermore, the claim that 
time spent in solitary confinement exacerbated a preexisting mental health condition was 
made strictly on a prolonged period in administrative segregation.  Therefore, Redden v. 
Ricci (2008) was removed from consideration. 
Having excluded those cases that did not meet the criteria delineated for this study, 
four judicial decisions remained.  These cases included the following:  Madrid v. Gomez 
(1995), Scarver v. Litscher (2006), Jones ‘El v. Berge (2004), and Goff v. Harper (1997).  
Cited by both social science and legal scholars as the foremost case addressing long-term 
disciplinary solitary confinement and prisoners with preexisting mental health conditions, 
the court in Madrid v. Gomez (1995) contemplated the issue of excessive use of force on 
inmates confined in the SHU (Haney, 2003; Haney & Lynch, 1997; Harvard Law Review, 
2008; Lobel, 2008; Perlin & Dlugacz, 2008; Pizarro & Narag, 2008; Weidman, 2004; Wynn 
& Szatrowski, 2004).  More importantly for purposes of the present qualitative exploration, 
the court also considered the “totality of conditions” in the segregation unit and their effect 
on inmates with psychological disorders.  As such, the judicial ruling was included for 
consideration.   
An appellate court case, Scarver v. Litscher (2006), is also often identified in the 
existing social science and legal literature as a significant ruling for mentally ill incarcerates 
seeking Eighth Amendment protection from segregation conditions  (Fellner, 2006; Kupers, 
2008; McConville & Kelly, 2007; Perlin & Dlugacz, 2008).  Scarver was an inmate suffering 
from severe schizophrenia and delusions.  He was placed in prolonged punitive solitary Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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confinement.  As he alleged, the conditions in segregation were so severe that they 
dramatically aggravated his psychological disorders.  Thus, the case was included in the 
data set. 
In Jones ‘El v. Berge (2004), a group of inmates housed in extended disciplinary 
segregation, including six diagnosed with mental illnesses, sought protection from cruel and 
unusual punishment.  Although a consent decree agreement was reached, a judgment was 
entered.  In spite of the agreement, the opinion itself is widely referred to in the extant 
literature as particularly useful in discerning the court‟s understanding of matters related to 
long-term disciplinary segregation and incarcerates with psychological disorders  (Arrigo & 
Bullock, 2008; Harvard Law Review, 2008; Perlin & Dlugacz, 2008; Pizarro & Narag, 2008; 
Weidman, 2004).  Consequently, the case was included in the analysis.  
Goff v. Harper (1997) involved three inmates who sought protection from cruel and 
unusual punishment after spending a prolonged period in punitive segregation.  Although 
the Eighth Amendment violation claim included time in administrative segregation, the court 
focused primarily on the conditions in disciplinary solitary confinement and their effect on 
prisoners with alleged mental health conditions.  While the case does not appear frequently 
in the social science or law review literature, it met the criteria delineated for this study.  As 
such, it was included in the data set.     
For the purpose of thoroughness, the judicial opinions cited and subsequently 
referenced in each of the four aforementioned cases were reviewed to determine if any of 
them warranted inclusion in the data set.  This step in the process produced a significant 
number of judicial opinions.  However, mindful of the extant social science and law review 
literature, the vast majority of these cases did not meet the specific criteria established for 
this investigation (Haney & Lynch, 1997; Perlin & Dlugacz, 2008; Weidman, 2004).  
Notwithstanding this finding, two cases were appropriate for consideration.  Citing Scarver 
v. Litscher (2006), Vasquez v. Frank (2006) involved an incarcerate who sought protection Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
Special Edition Vol 1, Nov, 2010: pp. 1-82                     Bersot & Arrigo 
 
29 
 
from cruel and unusual punishment given his prolonged disciplinary solitary confinement.  
Vasquez claimed that the conditions in which he was held were so severe that they 
exacerbated his mental health condition.
13  Citing Madrid v. Gomez (1995), the court in 
Torres et al. v. Commissioner of Correction et al. (1998) reviewed an Eighth Amendment 
violation claim based on prisoners‟ extended confinement in a disciplinary isolation unit in 
which some alleged deteriorated psychological conditions.  Thus, both cases were retained 
for critical textual examination.
14    
Having selected six district court and appellate court cases that met the evaluative 
criteria, two levels of qualitative analysis were performed.
15  As discussed previously, the 
present inquiry sought to determine the jurisprudential intent by examining the plain 
meaning evident in the courts‟ rulings.  This and similar methodologies have been utilized in 
the past to discern legislative intent.  In these investigations, the “ordinary usage” of terms 
and the “textual context” distinguishable in the statutes were examined (Hall & Wright, 
2008; Phillips & Grattet, 2000; Randolph, 1994).  Interestingly, some investigators note 
that this is an anecdotal approach that perhaps fails to adequately reveal the meaning 
underlying legislative intent (Easterbrook, 1994; Posner, 2008).  Indeed, critics argue that 
meaning depends upon context and, as such, may be interpreted differently based on an 
individual‟s understanding of certain rhetoric (Posner, 2008).  Thus, subjecting the courts‟ 
rulings themselves to systematic textual exegeses is preferred when determining 
jurisprudential intent.  Mindful of this, an interpretive analysis was conducted to ascertain 
the plain meaning of the legal language communicated in the court decisions that comprise 
this data set. 
Following the law-psychology-justice approach employed by Sellers and Arrigo 
(2009), a series of queries were compiled to assist in identifying the plain meaning located 
within the judicial opinions.  These investigators adopted the qualitative strategy first 
delineated by Ritchie and Spencer (2002).  The questions were both contextual (i.e., the Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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state of what is) and diagnostic (i.e., the cause or rationale for what is) in nature, and were 
specifically designed to yield an empirically sound direction when conducting applied policy 
research (Ritchie & Spencer, 2002, p. 307).  This ensuing inquiry utilized a similar method.  
The following queries were posed in relation to each judicial opinion:    
1)  What are the dimensions of attitudes or perceptions that are held?  
2)  What factors underlie particular attitudes or perceptions?  
3)  Why are decisions or actions taken or not taken?  
4)  Why do particular needs arise?  
5)  Why are services or programs not being used?  
6)  What are the goals, purposes, and concerns of the decisions or actions taken or 
not taken? 
7)  What needs of society are represented by the decisions or actions taken or not 
taken? 
These seven questions guided the following investigation and facilitated the textual 
assessment of the legal rhetoric.   
The first query seeks to determine how the courts understand the legal issues and 
controversies surrounding solitary confinement.  For example, do the rulings indicate the 
courts‟ awareness of their influence and role in how correctional institutions operate?  The 
second question addresses factors that influence these attitudes and perceptions.  To 
illustrate, how does the perception that such disciplinary confinement is necessary in order 
to house prisoners deemed the “worst of the worst” (see, Arrigo & Bullock, 2008; Pizarro & 
Narag, 2008; Rhodes, 2004) affect the courts‟ opinions?  Queries three, four, and five 
attempt to ascertain the courts‟ rationale in weighing issues such as what constitutes the 
basic provisions of life or what determines if a punishment is overtly severe.  For example, 
do the courts perceive prisoners with preexisting mental health conditions as capable of 
psychologically withstanding the harmful effects of solitary confinement?  Moreover, given Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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the literature indicating that the public strongly supports increasingly punitive sentences 
(Pizarro & Narag, 2008; Rhodes, 2004; Sellers & Arrigo, 2009), are the courts‟ opinions on 
long-term disciplinary solitary confinement influenced by this sentiment?  Do the rulings 
reflect an understanding of prison conditions (e.g., frequency in which mentally ill inmates 
have access to a psychiatric care worker) and the needs of prison administrators (e.g., to 
prevent a psychiatrically disordered inmate from engaging in self-injurious behavior)?  Are 
the decisions informed by prison administrators‟ insistence that solitary confinement is 
imperative to ensure effective correctional management?  The final two questions attempt 
to determine what the court believes is important.  In other words, these queries explore 
specific terms and phrases found in the judicial opinions that disclose what the courts value 
when considering long-term disciplinary segregation and incarcerates with mental health 
conditions.  For example, do the jurists believe that the discretion afforded to prison 
administrators in maintaining a secure environment takes precedence over inmates‟ 
constitutional rights? 
Although the ensuing investigation specifies the jurisprudential intent located in the 
courts‟ rulings, this is not the same as delineating the moral philosophy that informs this 
intent (Sellers & Arrigo, 2009).  To address this matter, a second level of qualitative 
analysis was applied to each of the judicial opinions.  This subsequent level of analysis is 
more textual and interpretive in design (Arrigo, 1993; 1999, 2003; Macken, 2006; Sellers & 
Arrigo, 2009). Textual analysis as employed here intends “to explicate how assumptions 
about self and society, private and  public, and state and society – the essentials that 
underlie traditional legal thought – are encoded in law” (Mercuro & Medema, 1998, p. 169).    
In order to uncover or to make explicit the courts‟ ethical reasoning, the legal 
language that constituted jurisprudential intent was carefully scrutinized.  After relying on 
the seven questions to extrapolate the plain meaning and to discern the underlying 
jurisprudential intent of the judicial opinions, the textual content was itself the source Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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inquiry.  Specifically, the terms and/or phrases indicating plain meaning were examined.  
Each word or expression was analyzed mindful of the three principal schools of ethics.  
These schools include consequentialism and its variants ethical egoism, contractualism, and 
utilitarianism; formalism; and virtue-based moral reasoning.    
The purpose of this second level of qualitative analysis was to determine what Holsti 
described as a text‟s “manifest content” (1969, p. 12).  Essentially, manifest content 
represents the message conveyed during a court proceeding or within a legal opinion.  
When manifest content is made explicit, it is then possible to identify the content‟s 
underlying ethical import.  To illustrate, if a court employs rhetoric noting a duty to uphold 
deference to correctional institution administrators, then this constitutes manifest content.  
Moreover, this content advances the moral philosophy of formalism.  Additionally, if a legal 
opinion employs rhetoric specifying that the due process interests of a mentally disordered 
inmate in solitary confinement must be weighed against the prison‟s concerns for effective 
management and correctional control, then this signifies manifest content.  Moreover, what 
informs this content is an underlying ethic of utilitarianism.  In those instances where 
manifest content does not convey ethical reasoning, no moral philosophy can be specified.  
Sequencing from jurisprudential intent, to manifest content, to ethical rationale 
represents a data point that begins to specify the core moral philosophy within a judicial 
opinion (Sellers & Arrigo, 2009).  However, this analysis is incomplete.  In order to more 
completely ascertain the ethic of a given legal opinion, it is necessary to engage in a 
thematic investigation.  Thus, as a dimension of this study‟s methodology, an identification 
of ethical-philosophical themes as derived from the particular instances of manifest content 
(words/phrases) in each judicial opinion was conducted.  This is what is meant by intra-
textual analysis.  Additionally, as a basis to determine the overall moral philosophy 
informing the case law regarding: (1) prisoners placed in long-term, disciplinary solitary 
confinement; (2) with preexisting mental health conditions; (3) where the Eighth Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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Amendment‟s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is at issue, a similar thematic 
examination was conducted between the six cases constituting the data set.  This is what is 
meant by inter-textual analysis.  
In summary, the method utilized in this study was both qualitative and interpretive 
in design.  In order to determine jurisprudential intent, plain meaning was the source of 
inquiry. This was ascertained by eliciting information about the six cases as guided by the 
seven previously specified questions.  This undertaking represented the first level of 
analysis.  The second level of analysis was more textual in orientation and it consisted of 
two layers. First, the manifest content was reviewed as derived from the jurisprudential 
intent.  At issue here were the actual words or phrases communicated by jurists in 
rendering their opinions.  Second, these words or phrase were themselves evaluated against 
the logic of three schools of ethics as a way to determine what moral philosophy informed 
this manifest content.  To more completely specify the ethics of a particular case in the data 
set, thematic analysis was performed.  All instances of manifest content informed by an 
ethical rationale were identified and compared against all others within that judicial opinion 
(i.e., intra-textuality).  The same strategy was employed across the six cases, yielding a 
collective assessment of the moral philosophy informing the prevailing judicial opinions in 
this area of correctional law (i.e., inter-textuality). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Level 1 Analysis 
Data for the Level 1 analysis specify the underlying jurisprudential intent contained 
in each judicial opinion (see Appendix A).  In Madrid v. Gomez (1995), the court 
communicated its perceptions regarding prisoners with preexisting mental health conditions 
serving time in long-term solitary confinement.  For example, the court noted that: “By 
virtue of their conviction, inmates forfeit many of their liberties and rights” (p. 1244).  This Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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statement conveys the judicial attitude that, under certain delineated circumstances, 
incarcerates are not guaranteed the same lawful protections that are otherwise afforded to 
those not criminally confined.  As such, the court did not perceive the rights and liberties of 
prisoners in the same manner as non-prisoners who might bring a complaint before a legal 
tribunal. 
Furthermore, the decision in Madrid clearly expressed the court‟s perception 
regarding its role in determining how correctional administrators ought to manage prison 
facilities.  As the case opinion explained, “It is not the Court‟s function to pass judgment on 
the policy choices of prison officials” (p. 1262).  Thus, correctional administrators are 
“entitled to design and operate the SHU consistent with the penal philosophy of their 
choosing” (p.1262), which may include punitive responses that “emphasize idleness, 
deterrence, and deprivation” (p. 1262).   In fact, the court acknowledged the challenges 
prison officials face in maintaining penal institutions designed to confine individuals who 
cannot conform to society‟s or the institution‟s rules and regulations.  As such, the attitude 
expressed by the Madrid court maintained that it is “well within defendants' far ranging 
discretion” (p. 1261) to segregate “inmates for disciplinary or security reasons” as it “is a 
well established and penologically justified practice” (p. 1261).   
Statements made in the Madrid decision also offered some clues regarding the 
degree to which correctional conditions might inflict psychological harm on incarcerates.  To 
illustrate, the court observed that, “the very nature of prison confinement may have a 
deleterious impact on the mental state of prisoners” (p. 1262).  In regard to the SHU 
discussed in this case, the legal opinion acknowledged that such confinement “will likely 
inflict some degree of psychological trauma upon most inmates confined there for more 
than brief periods” (p. 1265).   
Notwithstanding the court‟s contention that prison officials must be given deference 
in managing correctional facilities – including solitary confinement units that may induce or Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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expedite mental deterioration – the Madrid decision communicated a fundamental belief that 
“all humans are composed of more than flesh and bone” (p. 1261).  This assertion includes 
prisoners who are so irascible that they must “be locked away not only from their fellow 
citizens, but from other inmates as well” (p. 1261).  In support of these statements, the 
court expressed the perception that psychological well-being is as significant as is corporal 
health.  Indeed, the court opined that mental wellness “is a need as essential to a 
meaningful human existence as other basic physical demands our bodies may make for 
shelter, warmth or sanitation” (p. 1261).  Additional statements emanating from the 
decision indicated that while conditions of confinement might be “restrictive and even 
harsh…, “basic human need[s]” and “life‟s basic necessities” (p. 1262) must be met and 
availed to those serving prison time, including those held in long-term disciplinary solitary 
confinement.  
In the Madrid case, the conditions that met (or failed to meet) the “basic necessity of 
human existence” (p. 1263) constituted the core Eighth Amendment challenge.  As the 
court reasoned: 
“On the one hand, a condition that is sufficiently harmful to inmates or otherwise 
reprehensible to civilized society will at some point yield to constitutional constraints, 
even if the condition has some penological justification.  Thus, defendants' insistence 
that the SHU is "working" as a secure environment for disruptive prisoners does not 
and cannot determine whether the SHU passes constitutional muster. No prison, for 
example, can deprive inmates of a basic human need, even though the underlying 
conditions might otherwise arguably promote some penological objective.  On the 
other hand, a condition or other prison measure that has little or no penological 
value may offend constitutional values upon a lower showing of injury or harm”  (pp. 
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However, as the court explained, “"psychological pain" that results from idleness in 
segregation is not sufficient to implicate the Eighth Amendment” (p. 1262), nor does the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment “guarantee that inmates will not suffer 
some psychological effects from incarceration or segregation” (p. 1263).   
Finally, the Madrid court articulated a perspective on what it deemed best for society.  
As a source for communicating jurisprudential intent, the opinion commented on how 
inmates who serve time in long-term disciplinary solitary confinement might nevertheless 
thrive once released from prison.  As the legal opinion stipulated, “those who have 
transgressed the law are still fellow human beings –  most of whom will one day return to 
society” (p. 1244).  As such, “even those prisoners at the "bottom of the social heap…have, 
nonetheless, a human dignity” (p. 1244).  Basing its rationale on the view that our nation 
“aspires to the highest standards of civilization,” the court maintained that “there is simply 
no place for abuse and mistreatment, even in the darkest of jailhouse cells” (p. 1245).  
These comments disclosed the court‟s felt obligation to recognize the humaneness of 
incarcerates and responsibility to ensure that they were psychologically equipped to engage 
others in a pro-social manner should custodial release and community reentry follow.   
Given these collective assertions, perceptions, and attitudes, the court did not 
extend the Eighth Amendment‟s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to all 
prisoners serving time in long-term disciplinary solitary confinement.  Although mindful that 
“the conditions in the SHU [might] press the outer bounds of what most humans can 
psychologically tolerate” (p. 1267), the court communicated its intentions when stating that 
“the record does not satisfactorily demonstrate that there is a sufficiently high risk to all 
inmates of incurring a serious mental illness from exposure to conditions in the SHU to find 
that the conditions [themselves] constitute a per se deprivation of a basic necessity of life” 
(p. 1267).  Consequently, the Madrid court ordered that only those inmates with preexisting 
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Data collected from the Scarver v. Litscher (2006) case also provided insight into 
underlying jurisprudential intent.  Similar to the decision in Madrid, the Scarver court held a 
similar perception that “Federal judges must always be circumspect in imposing their ideas 
about civilized and effective prison administration on state prison officials” (p. 976), 
especially since judges “know little about the management of prisons” (p. 977).  Statements 
made that affirmed the trial court’s decision communicated the attitude that 
“managerial judgments generally are the province of other branches of government” (p. 
977) and, furthermore, that “it is unseemly for federal courts to tell a state…how to run its 
prison system” (p. 977). 
Mindful of the lack of judicial authority to determine and/or evaluate penal 
institutional administration, the court attempted to strike a “delicate balance” (p. 976) by 
stating that, “Prison authorities must be given considerable latitude in the design of 
measures for controlling homicidal maniacs without exacerbating their manias beyond what 
is necessary for security” (p. 976).  Following the rationale for the use of long-term 
disciplinary solitary confinement employed in the Madrid case, the Scarver court affirmed 
the trial court’s view that such  custodial placement was necesary, especially in curbing 
the behavior of extremely volatile inmates who either refuse to follow or are incapable of 
adhering to prison rules and regulations.  Scarver, a diagnosed schizophrenic who murdered 
two fellow inmates while incarcerated, was perceived by the court as “extremely dangerous” 
(p. 973) and “undeterrable” (p. 976).   
The court acknowledged the dearth of policies and programs designed to address the 
unique needs of both correctional administrators and inmates, like Scarver, who suffer from 
psychiatric illness and consistently violate prison rules.  Revealing its intent, the court 
opined, “Maybe there is some well-known protocol for dealing with the Scarvers of this 
world, though probably there is not (we have found none, and his lawyer has pointed us to 
none)” (p. 976).  Indeed, the Scarver case indicated that, “the treatment of a mentally ill Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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prisoner who also happens to have murdered two other inmates is much more complicated 
than the treatment of a harmless lunatic” (p. 976).  Thus, while the conditions in a solitary 
confinement unit “disturb psychotics” (p. 974) like Scarver, the lower court‟s decision was 
nonetheless upheld.  As the appellate case intimated, “It is a fair inference that conditions 
at Supermax aggravated the symptoms of his mental illness and by doing so inflicted severe 
physical and especially mental suffering” (p. 975).  Ultimately, the Scarver court reasoned 
that while segregating the petitioner from fellow “inmates and staff…[might] unavoidably 
aggravate his psychosis…the measures [did] not violate the Constitution” (p. 976). 
In the case of Jones ‘El v. Berge (2004), the court‟s commentary regarding the 
placement of mentally ill incarcerates in long-term disciplinary segregation was based on its 
knowledge of the supermax prison.  The court recognized that the “Supermax was built to 
respond to a perceived need by wardens” to house “dangerous and recalcitrant inmates” (p. 
1103).  Although the language of the legal opinion considered the assertion by correctional 
officials that, at times, prisoners “manipulate[d] staff” (p. 1118), the court reasoned that 
“this does not mean that they [incarcerates] are not seriously mentally ill” (p. 1118). 
The rhetoric employed in the Jones ‘El case indicated the court‟s acute awareness of 
how prolonged segregation might exacerbate the mental health conditions of inmates with 
preexisting diagnoses.  To illustrate, the court stated that, “Supermax is known to cause 
severe psychiatric morbidity, disability, suffering and mortality” (p. 1101).  Indeed, the 
court poignantly expressed concern and a resolute sense of motivation to act regarding the 
potentially cruel and unusual circumstances surrounding long-term disciplinary segregation. 
The following description of the correctional facility in the Jones ‘El case conveys this 
attitude: 
“Several features of Supermax are particularly damaging to inmates with serious 
mental illnesses. The almost total sensory deprivation in Levels One and Two is 
relentless: inmates are kept confined alone in their cells for all but four hours a Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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week. The exercise cell is devoid of equipment. The constant illumination is 
disorienting, as is the difficulty in knowing the time of day. The vestibule architecture 
and solid boxcar doors prevent any incidental interaction between inmates and 
guards” (p. 1118). 
Like the ruling in Madrid, the Jones ‘El court deliberated on whether confining 
incarcerates in solitary confinement served a “legitimate penological interest” (p. 1117).  In 
determining the reasonableness of prolonged segregation for inmates, the judicial opinion 
engaged in the weighing of relevant interests.  That is, the court sought to ascertain a 
“balance of harms” in which the interests expressed through the testimony of supermax 
administrators were balanced against the interests stated by those suffering under the 
alleged cruel and unusual solitary confinement conditions.  With respect to correctional 
officers, the court communicated a desire to “interfere” (p. 1125) only to a “minimal 
degree” (p. 1125) in the operation of the supermax facility.  However, the court also 
revealed its unease with confining mentally ill prisoners in prolonged punitive segregation, 
and ultimately elucidated its intent in the following passage: 
“Defendants assert that an order from this court requiring the transfer of seriously 
mentally ill inmates is not the least intrusive means of alleviating the problems the 
inmates are experiencing. Instead, defendants suggest, increasing the mental health 
staff would be a way to lessen the court's interference with prison management.  I 
disagree.  I am convinced that the staffing ratio is not the sole factor making up the 
potentially damaging conditions for mentally ill inmates; the physical architecture of 
Supermax and the customs and policies also contribute to the conditions” (pp. 1123-
24). 
The court‟s language disclosed a second balancing test.  Similar to the Madrid and 
Scarver decisions, the Jones’ El opinion undertook a review of competing interests in order 
to discern what would be of the greatest benefit to society.  As the court noted, “the public Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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interest is not served by housing seriously mentally ill inmates at Supermax under 
conditions in which they risk irreparable emotional damage and, in some cases, a risk of 
death by suicide” (p. 1125).  Affirming the intent revealed in the previous statement, the 
court concluded that, “the public interest will be served by protecting the Eighth 
Amendment rights of inmates housed at Supermax” (p. 1125).   
Although the decision in the Jones ‘El case confirmed that conditions in the supermax  
facility were a factor in the deterioration of psychologically disordered inmates, the court 
was also fully aware of its restricted influence on prison management.  Specifically, the 
“Prison Litigation Reform Act limits the scope of preliminary injunctive relief available in 
challenges to prison conditions” (p. 1116).  As such, the Act provides no basis for a court to 
significantly impose correctional policy changes.  Mindful of this, the Jones ‘El court ordered 
that only incarcerates suffering from diagnosed mental health conditions were protected 
under the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, as delineated by the Eighth 
Amendment.  Consistent with this perspective, the legal opinion stipulated: “Supermax was 
designed to house especially disruptive and recalcitrant prisoners but not mentally ill ones” 
(p. 1118).  Thus, while the decision in Jones ‘El recognized that correctional administrators 
“should be afforded due deference,” the court concluded that “it does not overstep these 
bounds to order that [prisoners] not be housed at Supermax” (p. 1124)   
Consistent with previous Eighth Amendment cases involving long-term disciplinary 
solitary confinement and mentally ill incarcerates, an evaluation of the plain meaning of the 
legal language found in the Goff case revealed its underlying jurisprudential intent.  In 
ascertaining whether Goff was capable of invoking protection from overtly harsh prison 
conditions, the court cited the Eighth Amendment standards set forth in several Supreme 
Court decisions. This undertaking conveyed the Goff court‟s perception of what constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment, and how a legal tribunal must act when presented with such 
circumstances.  As the court opined: Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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“Justice Douglas's pronouncement that, "The Eighth Amendment expresses the 
revulsion of civilized man against barbarous acts – the 'cry of horror' against man's 
inhumanity to his fellow man.”  Along these same lines, Justice Brennan described a 
court's duty in Eighth Amendment cases as the need to determine "whether a 
challenged punishment comports with human dignity” (pp. 111-12).  
The rhetoric employed in the Goff ruling articulated a duty to provide “great 
deference to the expertise of the officials who perform the always difficult and often 
thankless task of running a prison” (p. 153).  Supporting this statement, the legal opinion 
reasoned that “The Court does not pretend that it knows more than the men and women 
who run the Penitentiary” (p. 153), and, accordingly, “is not attempting to run or 
micromanage the prisons” (p. 157).  Although the court intimated that it “could have easily 
taken the position that a hands-off position as to these violations [was] the only way to go 
based on today's law-and-order mentality” (p. 156), it ultimately disagreed with this 
perspective.  Instead, underlying jurisprudential intent was made evident in the assertion 
that, “the Court's job is only to identify constitutional violations if any exist” (p. 153). 
Similar to previous judicial rulings on the subject, the Goff court expressed concern 
for the lack of programs available to mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement.  For 
example, commenting on testimony related to the prison‟s failure to meet the distinct needs 
of incarcerates with psychological disorders, the legal opinion observed that: 
 “…there is a great demand for a special needs program at the Penitentiary which can 
handle maximum security inmates.  The Court also found Dr. Loeffelholz has 
expressed this professional opinion to his bosses (presumably the director of the 
Iowa Department of Corrections) but no action has been taken.  Then-Warden 
Acevedo, testified that the Illinois Department of Corrections, his immediate past 
employer, had special needs programs such as separate wings of prisons devoted to 
taking care of inmates with mental problems, that were far superior to those Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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established by the Iowa Department of Corrections.  He said, when a facility devotes 
itself exclusively to taking care of mentally ill patients, it can provide much better 
psychiatric care” (p. 118). 
In consideration of this testimony, the court reasoned that “The State has had opportunities 
to rectify or partially rectify the situation and has done nothing” (p. 156).  In addition to the 
court‟s attitude conveyed through this statement, the language of the decision 
communicated an intention to hold correctional administrators responsible for their 
“deliberate indifference” (p. 113) with respect to the mental health status of prisons.  The 
Goff court was “unpersuaded” (p. 153) that the “extraordinary long lockup sentences” (p. 
153) and the considerably “small size of the cells in which lockup inmates serve twenty-
three or twenty-four hours a day” (p. 153) constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. 
However, it did indicate that psychologically disordered incarcerates were not suited for 
confinement in segregation.  As such, the Goff court concluded that “inmates with mental 
health disorders at ISP [Illionis Supermax Prison] who are not receiving treatment for their 
needs, are being held under conditions which violate the Eighth Amendment” (p. 120). 
A review of the data extracted from the Vasquez v. Frank (2006) case revealed the 
court‟s knowledge of the debilitating effects isolation poses for inmates with preexisting 
mental health conditions, especially as discussed in those cases previously subjected to 
textual exegeses.  The court‟s rhetoric communicated a concern for certain conditions in 
solitary confinement units, such as continuously illuminated cells, that “may inflict severe 
suffering on mentally ill inmates” (p. 541).  In this instance, the appellate court 
acknowledged that Vasquez “suffers from emotional distress, depression, anxiety, and 
"other psychological problems” (p. 540).  While in segregation, Vasquez‟s cell “was 
illuminated 24 hours a day. Although he was able to lower the lighting, he could not turn it 
off completely. [Vasquez] allege[d] that the constant illumination aggravated his mental Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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illness and caused him to suffer from insomnia, migraines, eye pain, and blurry vision” (p. 
540). 
Citing the lower court‟s ruling, the Vasquez judicial opinion asserted that petitioner‟s 
“allegations about the lighting and air quality in his cell [were] not so fantastical that the 
district court could dismiss them out of hand” (p. 540).  Moreover, even though “a district 
court [might] strongly suspect that an inmate's claims lack merit…[this] is not a legitimate 
ground for dismissal” (p. 540).  Similar to the previous cases analyzed thus far in the data 
set, the Vasquez decision elucidated the standard by which jurists must determine an Eighth 
Amendment violation.  As the court opined, “prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment 
when they deliberately ignore a serious medical condition…or create „an unreasonable risk of 
serious damage‟ to an inmate's future health” (p. 540). 
In determining whether correctional administrators subjected Vasquez to cruel and 
unusual conditions of confinement, the court considered the extent to which management 
officials were cognizant of his psychological maladies.  As the court noted, Vasquez “filed 
grievances and told medical personnel about these conditions, but prison personnel did not 
rectify the problem for over three years” (p. 540).  The Vasquez court further asserted that 
“Prison officials were aware of these adverse reactions” (p. 541), but failed to respond 
appropriately.  As such, petitioner‟s claims that the segregation conditions exacerbated his 
mental illness were deemed meritorious. 
In Torres et al. v. Commissioner of Correction et al. (1998), the court affirmed the 
trial court‟s decision.  The opinion of the court was consistent with previously analyzed 
cases regarding the perceived role of the judiciary in matters related to Eighth Amendment 
challenges and mentally ill prisoners in long-term segregation.  However, unlike these 
earlier cases, the Torres et al. court limited its scope of analysis to the testimony of mental 
health professionals.  This included witness evidence from Dr. Stuart Grassian, who offered 
his expert testimony on the deleterious effects of prolonged punitive segregation in the Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
Special Edition Vol 1, Nov, 2010: pp. 1-82                     Bersot & Arrigo 
 
44 
 
Madrid case.  Departing from the ruling in these respective cases, the Torres et al. court 
reasoned that, “expert opinion regarding what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is 
entitled to little weight” (p. 614).  Indeed, the court explicitly delineated its position by 
stating that, “whether prison conditions are sufficiently harmful to establish an Eighth 
Amendment violation, is a purely legal determination for the court to make” (p. 614). 
However, following the Madrid, Scarver, Jones ‘El, Goff, and Vasquez rulings, the 
Torres et al. court established the standard that must be met in order to succeed on an 
Eighth Amendment challenge.  Utilizing a two-prong test, the court noted that the “plaintiff-
inmate” must demonstrate that the “conditions of confinement presented “a substantial risk 
of serious harm” and that correctional officers “acted with “deliberate indifference” to 
prisoner safety and well-being (pp. 613-14).  Further, the opinion of the Torres et al. court 
was informed by previous decisions made by both the U.S. Court of Appeals and the 
presiding court on Eighth Amendment challenges raised by incarcerates alleging 
psychological harm stemming from the conditions of their confinement.  Consider the 
following passage found in the Torres et al. decision: 
“As the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has observed, „federal 
appellate decisions during the past decade which have focused on the factor of 
segregated confinement and lack of inmate contact reveals to us a widely shared 
disinclination to declare even very lengthy periods of segregated confinement beyond 
the pale of minimally civilized conduct on the part of prison authorities.  Similarly, in 
Libby v. Commissioner of Correction, 385 Mass. 421, 431, 432 N.E.2d 486 (1982), 
we held that a prison isolation unit whose conditions were more restrictive than 
those in DDU [Department Disciplinary Unit] did not offend the Eighth Amendment 
because its inmates were provided adequate food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, 
and communication with others‟ Libby, 385 Mass. at 431-432. The isolation and Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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loneliness of which the plaintiffs complain, we concluded, is not in and of itself 
unconstitutional” (p. 615). 
Relying primarily on previous rulings, the Torres et al. court affirmed the lower 
court‟s decision.  In this instance, the harsh conditions claimed by the plaintiff-inmates were 
balanced against those asserted in the case of Libby v. Commissioner of Correction (1982).  
This judicial opinion reasoned that, “If conditions of confinement [that were] harsher than 
those posed by DDU did not offend the Eighth Amendment, it follows that DDU's 
confinement is likewise constitutional" (p. 615).  As such, the Torres et al. court based its 
opinion on the fact that the “only arguable dispute” concerns the “extent to which these 
conditions generally caused inmates' psychological problems” (p. 614).  As a result, the 
court determined that “The judge's findings and the parties‟ stipulation demonstrate that 
DDU confinement, while uncomfortable, is a far cry from…„barbaric‟ conditions” (p. 617), 
and that the “judge acted properly in allowing the defendants‟ motion for summary 
judgment” (p. 615). 
 
Level 2 Analysis 
After the data obtained from each of the six cases were examined for purposes of 
delineating unstated jurisprudential intent, the second level of analysis was the focus of 
qualitative scrutiny (see Appendix B).
16  This second and more textual stage entailed an 
interpretation of the legal language (manifest content) itself, and the underlying ethical 
meaning communicated through and embedded within the words and/or phrases that 
constituted the level 1 data.   In other words, “the goal of this [subsequent] inquiry was to 
determine what moral philosophy was conveyed through jurisprudential intent, mindful of 
the three ethical schools of thought under consideration as well as their corresponding 
principles” (Sellers & Arrigo, 2009, p. 471).
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 A review of the phraseology employed in the Madrid decision revealed the court‟s 
orientation toward consequentialism and its variant utilitarianism.  The following passage is 
illustrative of the court‟s weighing of interests: 
“Conditions may be harsher than necessary to accommodate the needs of the 
institution with respect to these populations. However, giving defendants the wide-
ranging deference they are owed in these matters, we can not say that the 
conditions overall lack any penological justification” (p. 1263).   
Central to the philosophy of utilitarianism is the notion of consequences in choice-making 
and action that advance the greatest happiness or interests for the greatest number of 
citizens (e.g., Bank, 2008; Cahn, 2009; Mill, 1957). Consistent with this ethical reasoning, 
the Madrid court expressed concern for the conditions of disciplinary solitary confinement 
units, especially if excessively severe (“harsher than necessary”), potentially impacting 
adversely incarcerates suffering from preexisting psychological disorders.  However, the 
court was also cognizant of the need to afford great discretion to prison administrators 
(“wide-ranging deference”) in determining policies and procedures essential to effectively 
managing penal institutions.  Thus, the manifest content communicated the court‟s 
utilitarian ethic of balancing the mental well-being of incarcerates against the rights of 
prison administrators, in order to promote the greatest happiness for and interests of the 
majority of individuals affected by the ruling.  
The manifest content discernable in the Madrid court‟s rhetoric aligned with a second 
moral philosophy.  Words and phrases employed in the court‟s decision were consistent with 
the logic of formalism and, in particular, Kantian ethics.  As noted previously, ethical 
formalism is based on moral duty.  Mindful of this dimension of Kantian philosophy, 
statements such as “duty and responsibility of this Court to ensure that constitutional rights 
are fully vindicated” (p. 1263) and “duty to assume some responsibility” (p. 1245) explicitly 
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obligation.  Moreover, other statements such as, “prisoners…have, nonetheless, a human 
dignity” (p. 1244) and “must ensure that prisons…do not degenerate into places that violate 
basic standards of decency and humanity” (p. 1245), were consistent with the Kantian 
maxim that all individuals are deserving of dignity.  Accordingly, when subjecting the 
manifest content located in the Madrid decision to level 2 textual exegeses, both utilitarian 
and Kantian reasoning informed the court‟s jurisprudential intent.   
Similar to the Madrid ruling, the manifest content found in the Scarver v. Litscher 
(2006) decision advanced the consequentialist perspective of utilitarianism.  Specifically, the 
case attempted to strike a “delicate balance” (p. 976) between the competing interests of 
correctional administrators and incarcerates.  As the court declared, “Prison authorities must 
be given considerable latitude in the design of measures for controlling homicidal maniacs 
without exacerbating their manias beyond what is necessary for security” (p. 976).  
Endorsing the utilitarian objective of achieving the greatest good for the largest possible 
constituency, the court sought to “protect other inmates or guards from Scarver or Scarver 
from himself” (p. 977).  Thus, informing the case‟s jurisprudential intent was an ethic that 
endeavored to reach a decision based on an assessment of what was deemed in the best 
interest of those employed by and serving time in the supermax prison, including Scarver 
himself. 
The rhetoric employed by the court in the Jones ‘El v. Berge (2004) case was also 
reviewed to determine its underlying moral philosophy.  Interestingly, similar to the Madrid 
opinion, the Jones ‘El court embraced both utilitarian and formalistic ethical principles in its 
manifest content.  To illustrate, the court engaged in a “balancing of harms” (p. 1123).  
Statements, such as “the court interferes in the management of Supermax to a minimal 
degree yet casts the net wide enough to catch any seriously mentally ill inmates” (p. 1125) 
reflected some consideration of competing interests.  On the one hand, the court sought to 
afford deference to Supermax administrators; on the other hand, the court recognized the Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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psychological welfare of inmates.  In other instances, the rights of incarcerates were 
measured against societal protection.  Illustrative of this point are the following passages: 
“the public interest is not served by housing seriously mentally ill inmates at Supermax” (p. 
1125) and “the public interest will be served by protecting the Eighth Amendment rights of 
inmates” (p. 1125).  As manifest content, these statements indicated a utilitarian approach 
that endeavored to ensure the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.   
Elsewhere, the Jones ‘El court also appropriated legal language consistent with 
formalist ethics.  Consider the following phrase: “defendants should be afforded due 
deference” (p. 1124). The notion of availing to one that which one is due reflects judicial 
obligation to honor prison administration rights.  This interpretation is consistent with 
comparable studies involving textual analyses of court opinions (Sellers & Arrigo, 2009). 
A textual evaluation of the legal rhetoric expressed in the Goff opinion signifies that 
the case was guided by consequentialist and formalist logic.  For example, the court stated 
that its goal was to “serve justice with a minimum of judicial intervention and provide prison 
officials with the maximum possible discretion to manage their own institution” (pp. 155-
56).  This manifest content is indicative of an interest-balancing argument in which the need 
to remedy a potential Eighth Amendment violation was weighed against the need to respect 
those who create and implement prison policies.  When interpreted ethically, the underlying 
meaning situated within this legal language is made evident.  Although the court wanted to 
ensure that inmates were lawfully protected from cruel and unusual punishment, it sought 
to limit its imposition on the rights and interests of correctional administrators. 
In addition to utilitarian principles informing the Goff court‟s jurisprudential intent, a 
formalistic orientation was also apparent.  Indeed, the manifest content revealed the court‟s 
perceived obligations regarding prisoners with preexisting mental health conditions placed in 
long-term disciplinary solitary confinement.  As the case opinion stipulated, “[T]he Court's 
job is only to identify constitutional violations if any exist; it is in the province of the Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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Penitentiary's officials to attend to those violations” (p. 153).  Similar to Madrid, Scarver, 
and Jones ‘El, the Goff court expressed a duty to demonstrate “great deference to the 
expertise of the officials…running a prison” (p. 153).  Consistent with the Kantian maxim of 
ensuring that all individuals are afforded a sense of dignity, the legal decision stated that, “a 
court's duty in Eighth Amendment cases [is] to determine "whether a challenged 
punishment comports with human dignity” (pp. 111-12).  As previously noted, textual 
exegeses of this manifest content endorse Kantian ethics. 
In the Torres et al. ruling, the court conveyed its reliance on consequentialist 
thinking.  As with the other cases comprising the data set, the Torres et al. court focused on 
whether correctional officers denied inmates their basic necessities of life, including 
psychological wellness.  Once again, the manifest content signified a commitment to 
interest-balancing in which the rights of incarcerates were assessed in relation to the rights 
of prison administrators.  As the judicial opinion explained, “conditions…more restrictive 
than those in DDU did not offend the Eighth Amendment because its inmates were provided 
adequate food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and communication with others” (p. 615).   
The Torres et al. decision also relied on legal rhetoric that, when interpreted 
ethically, indicated that formalist principles informed the court‟s underlying jurisprudential 
intent.  While Madrid, Scarver, Jones ‘El, and Goff discussed a duty to show deference to 
penal institution administrators, the Torres et al. court expressed its primary obligation 
differently.  Specifically, the case opinion declared that, “whether prison conditions are 
sufficiently harmful to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, is a purely legal 
determination for the court to make” (p. 614).  The conviction in Torres et al. that the 
judiciary bears sole responsibility for such legal determinations is consistent with the notion 
of duty as found in formalist thought.    
Having subjected the six cases that constitute the data set to additional textual 
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by the philosophies of consequentialism (including its variant utilitarianism) and ethical 
formalism (including its variant Kantian moral reasoning).  Intra-textually, consequentialism 
and the utilitarian perspective were most prominent in the cases of Jones ‘El and Scarver.  
Multiple examples of interest-balancing or comparable rhetoric were discerned from these 
legal opinions.  In contrast, the Madrid and Goff courts were intra-textually more closely 
associated with formalism and Kantian ethics.  The courts‟ language communicated 
numerous instances of this underlying ethical rationale; conversely, only one instance of 
utilitarian thinking was found in each of these two cases.  The underlying moral philosophy 
informing the jurisprudential intent of Torres et al. endorsed utilitarianism and Kantian 
ethics.  One example of each type of ethical reasoning was detected vis-à-vis the 
interpretive, though systematic, methodology.  
Inter-textually, each of the legal opinions engaged in interest-balancing arguments 
intended to promote the greatest good for the greatest number of individuals affected by 
the courts‟ decision-making rhetoric.  Moreover, in several other notable instances, the 
manifest content significantly aligned inter-textually with formalism and its variant, Kantian 
ethics. Indeed, underscoring the jurisprudential intent of all the legal opinions but Scarver 
was an obligation to uphold a particular duty to correctional administrators, to inmates, or 
to both.   
Thus, the textual analyses performed within and across the six cases involving: (1) 
Eighth Amendment challenges; (2) raised by incarcerates with preexisting mental health 
conditions; (3) confined in long-term disciplinary solitary confinement yielded compelling 
ethical findings. In short, the predominant moral reasoning situated within the courts‟ 
jurisprudential intent advanced philosophical principles emanating from utilitarianism and 
Kantian formalism.  
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IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
  This qualitative study critically explored the extant case law regarding Eighth 
Amendment challenges raised by inmates with preexisting mental health conditions serving 
time in prolonged disciplinary solitary confinement.  In order to determine the courts‟ 
rationale, two levels of analyses were performed.  The first level involved an examination of 
plain meaning that was educible from six judicial opinions. A series of seven questions were 
put to each of the cases.  These queries allowed for an extraction of data from the legal 
language itself in the form of key terms and/or phrases that revealed underlying 
jurisprudential intent.  After eliciting this pertinent information, the second level of analysis 
was performed.  This additional stage, more textual in nature, resituated the courts‟ specific 
words or phrases within their respective contexts, filtering them through prevailing moral 
philosophy as a way to ascertain the ethical reasoning embedded in the courts rhetoric.   
  The results indicated that principles traceable to utilitarian and Kantian moral 
philosophy informed the courts‟ decision-making logic. Specifically, within each case and 
across the decisions, an ethic of interest-balancing was employed wherein the needs of 
correctional administrators and the pubic were weighed against the rights of individual 
prisoners.  In other words, the legal opinions constituting this study‟s data set 
overwhelmingly sought the greater good for the majority (penal officials and society) over 
the minority (psychiatrically disordered inmates).  Additionally, underscoring the courts‟ 
jurisprudential intent was a commitment to upholding a duty as delineated by Kantian 
ethics.  In some instances, the bench expressed an obligation to defer to correctional 
administrators in their respective roles as prison managers.  In other instances, the bench 
endorsed a deontological duty to ensure that incarcerates benefited from the dignity that 
they deserved as human beings, notwithstanding their segregation from society and/or from 
others criminally confined.  Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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The qualitative findings also showed that legal tribunals largely disregard the social 
and behavioral science literature on inmate mental health, solitary confinement, and the 
potentially cruel and unusual conditions of long-term punitive isolation. Moreover, the 
preceding exegetical analysis revealed that the underlying ethical reasoning that informs 
judicial decision-making concerning mentally ill offenders subjected to protracted 
disciplinary solitary confinement is inadequate. This is because virtue-based moral 
philosophy does not underscore, does not anchor, the jurisprudential intent of the court.   
  While these results are significant, the research is not without several limitations. 
First, because this investigation explored a narrowly conceived (though clearly relevant) law 
and psychology issue, the sample of cases was relatively small (N=6).  Thus, findings based 
on these judicial opinions raise questions about generalizability.  Second, the legal decisions 
under review were rendered by district and appellate courts.  Opinions delivered in the 
lower courts typically are not considered precedent-setting (e.g., Hall & Wright, 2008; 
Harvard Law Review, 2008; Perlin & Dlugacz, 2008; Weidman, 2004).  Nevertheless, the 
decisions chosen for inclusion represented the prevailing case law that most fully revealed 
the courts‟ statements on the matter of Eighth Amendment challenges for prisoners with 
preexisting mental health conditions placed in long-term disciplinary solitary confinement.  
Third, no statutory analysis was undertaken to determine legislative intent.  Arguably, an 
assessment of such data would contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the 
courts‟ fundamental intent and the moral logic conveyed through its jurisprudence.  Fourth, 
the research methodology was largely experimental.  However, as Sellers and Arrigo (2009) 
noted in response to the novelty of their own method on which the present study was 
based, “concerns over whether various types of quantitative analyses of the law would yield 
similar findings warrant future [research] attention” (p.476).  Along these lines, subsequent 
empirical investigations might entail the construction of a survey instrument administered to 
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informed their decision-making when deliberating on the issue of psychiatrically disordered 
prisoners confined to punitive isolation for protracted periods.
18   These self-report data 
would then be compared against the actual narrative construction of the respective judicial 
opinions (i.e., jurisprudential intent discerned from plain meaning; moral reasoning 
ascertained through this intent).   
A fifth limitation attaches more generally to virtue ethics as addressed in the present 
inquiry.  Specifically, MacIntyre (2007) questioned whether who we are inherently denies 
our effort to develop habits of character. Thus, as he warned, “Where virtues are 
required…vices may also flourish” (p. 193). Guided by the overwhelming statistical evidence 
emanating from cognitive neuroscience, MacIntyre reasoned that we cannot cultivate 
excellence in being, especially since viciousness and mean-spiritedness seemingly prevail in 
the “Dark Age” of contemporary society and in its social systems (p. 263).  Whether it is 
possible to rise above our wicked inclinations is, most assuredly, debatable.  However, when 
considering the complex and compelling ethical concerns surrounding inmate mental health 
and solitary confinement, the question is not whether our nature betrays our efforts to 
develop moral character.  Rather, the question is whether we should, nevertheless, aspire 
to embody virtue.  Accordingly, the potential implied by Aristotle‟s moral philosophy was 
deemed significant for purposes of analyzing and critiquing the relevant case law.   
Despite these shortcomings, the results drew attention to a number of pressing and 
unambiguous matters regarding mentally ill offenders and prolonged punitive isolation.  
First, although the manifest content of the courts‟ opinions indicated, to varying degrees, a 
concern for the psychological well-being of incarcerates, the findings showed that legal 
tribunals largely disregard the empirical literature when determining Eighth Amendment 
violations alleged by psychiatrically disordered prisoners in long-term disciplinary solitary 
confinement.  Second, the court opinions stipulated that incarcerates who sought protection 
from so-called cruel and unusual isolative conditions were so confined because they were a Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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threat to the correctional milieu as much as to society.  Third, the case opinions specified 
that inmates did not enjoy the same protections and liberties that were afforded to non-
prisoners presenting a complaint before the bench.  As such, the courts‟ primary concern 
focused on the safety of society and the security of penal institutions.  Fourth, the 
respective courts relied on prescribed standards when determining whether confinement 
conditions should be deemed cruel and unusual.  In doing so, their obligation was to adhere 
to the legal protocol established for Eighth Amendment cases rather than to consider if 
placement in extreme solitude could reasonably be construed as inhumane.  Fifth, overall, 
the judicial opinions demonstrated a concern for empirical research and expert witness 
testimony regarding the inability of mentally ill offenders to conform their behavior in such a 
way that they could, essentially, earn their way out of isolation.  However, the case opinions 
failed to acknowledge the assorted adjustment deficits psychiatrically disordered inmates 
struggle to overcome. These deficiencies include compliance problems with the rules of 
isolation units and supermax prisons, as well as transfer difficulties when returned to the 
general prison population and community reentry impediments following their release back 
into society (Fellner, 2006; Haney, 2003; Kupers, 2008; Lovell et al., 2007; Rebman, 1999; 
Rhodes, 2004; Weidman, 2004). 
Thus, as this qualitative and interpretive study demonstrated, the courts endorsed 
an order-maintenance approach and, as such, advanced the needs of an organized society. 
However, the case decisions woefully failed to address the concerns raised by the social and 
behavioral science literature regarding psychiatrically disordered prisoners subsequently 
placed in prolonged disciplinary solitary confinement.  Perhaps this critical finding furthers 
the position that mentally ill offenders are not suited for isolation or any other type of 
strictly punitive confinement (e.g., Fellner, 2006; Haney, 2003; Johnson, 2002; King et al., 
2008), especially when the psychosocial attention they so desperately need is denied to 
them.  This is stimulation that enables incarcerates to retain a sense of autonomy, to Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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improve mental well-being, and to interact productively with others (Arrigo & Bullock, 
2008).
19   
The criminal justice system seeks to ensure the protection and welfare of its citizens.  
However, the validity of this notion must be assessed in relation to how the legal edifice 
effectively achieves that which it intends for all societal members.  As the foregoing inquiry 
suggested, the judicial apparatus is not addressing the specific needs of incarcerated 
offenders with preexisting mental health conditions.  As such, policies delineated to ensure 
that “the greater good” is realized must be reevaluated.  Indeed, this “deeper level of 
investigation entails a re-assessment of the moral philosophy through which the court‟s 
logic could be communicated, mindful of the more current trends in the law-psychology-
justice sub-field, and as developed in psychological jurisprudence” (Sellers & Arrigo, 2009, 
p. 477). 
 
Inmate Mental Health and Solitary Confinement: A Preliminary Law-Psychology-and-Justice 
Perspective    
 
The moral philosophy of utilitarianism and Kantian formalism inform the prevailing 
Eighth Amendment cases involving mentally ill prisoners placed in protracted disciplinary 
isolation.  Reflecting the legal system‟s long-held perception that its role is to safeguard 
citizens and to promote their moral rights, these ethical stances disregard the notion that 
“the proper end of the law is [the] promotion of human flourishing” (Farrelly & Solum, 2008, 
p. 2).  Rather than enabling offenders to pursue lives of excellence, the prescribed response 
of confining them in segregated units – where social interaction and mental stimulation are 
minimal – all but eliminates the possibility that they will learn how to engage others in a 
constructive manner that is consistent with a correctional institution‟s rules and with 
society‟s expectations.  Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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Indeed, as noted previously, a moral logic steeped in utilitarian principles is 
problematic in that the needs of some individuals are subjectively perceived as more worthy 
than those of others.  As Leighton and Reiman asserted, “If…morality requires that 
individuals be treated in certain ways no matter how many others may profit from their 
mistreatment, then utilitarianism seems to miss something crucial about morality” (2001, p. 
7).  A utilitarian ethic endorses, if not requires, that the interests of some be wholly 
neglected and/or disregarded.  Determining the value of an individual according to their 
ability to contribute to the satisfaction of the majority is inherently troubling.  
Moreover, relying upon deontological principles is equally distressing.  While treating 
others with unqualified dignity is fundamental, decisions made about the welfare of citizens 
based on prescribed duties primarily fails to acknowledge, let alone account for, the 
complexity of being human.  As Mossman (2006) explained, Kant “informs us about what 
sorts of interactions we may have with others in an ideal realm where everyone acts justly.  
But to figure out how to act in the real world, we must contend with the fact that not 
everyone will comply with rules” (p. 600).  Thus, judicial decision-making that relies chiefly 
upon utilitarian and deontological reasoning both legitimizes and ensures that the distinct 
needs of vulnerable populations, particularly mentally ill offenders, will not be met.   
Although not without its noted shortcomings, virtue ethics endeavors to see that all 
individuals are valued and encouraged to thrive.  As Aristotle (1998) asserted, people are 
social beings.  Long-term disciplinary solitary confinement denies prisoners that which is 
within their nature:  The fundamental need to connect with other humans.  Thus, while 
courts may reason that an isolated and mentally disordered inmate‟s “basic life necessities” 
are met while in isolative care, their longing for affirmative interaction is not met.  Indeed, 
as Haney (2009) explained,  
“because so much of our individual identity is socially constructed and maintained, 
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routine and recurring opportunities to ground thoughts and feelings in recognizable 
human contexts is not only painful but also personally destabilizing.  This is precisely 
why long-term isolated prisoners are literally at risk of losing their grasp on who they 
are, of how and why they are connected to a larger social world” (p. 16).   
While this perilous prospect unquestionably threatens the well-being of inmates without 
preexisting mental health conditions, it profoundly endangers those with psychiatric 
disorders who consistently struggle to maintain a sense of self and of place in society.  
Furthermore, it makes the promise of being able to do so for these individuals all but 
unattainable.  As a result, significant confinement and recidivism problems persist (Briggs et 
al., 2003; Elsner, 2004; Gagliardi et al., 2004; Lovell et al., 2007; Pizarro & Stenius, 2004; 
Rhodes, 2005).  Accordingly, the security of society and the well-being of its citizenry are, 
at best, dubious.   
If virtue-based ethics are to underscore the decision-making of legal tribunals, it 
follows, then, that proposed resolutions must enable all individuals involved to flourish 
(Farrelly & Solum, 2008, p. 16).  Further, as Solum (2008) noted, judges must become 
“fully virtuous agent[s]” (p. 190).  That is, they must promote an excellence in being for 
offenders, rather than strictly adhering to prescribed legal protocols or acting in deference 
to social norms (see also, Chappell, 2006).  In order to move beyond the utilitarian and 
deontological reasoning that engulfs judicial decision-making, an alternative jurisprudence 
must be explored.   
Mindful of the principles espoused by virtue ethics, PJ raises the issue of “whether 
something more, or something better can (and should) be done for all parties” (Sellers & 
Arrigo, 2009, p. 478).  Within its domain, the practices of therapeutic jurisprudence, 
restorative justice, and commonsense justice all promote the law-psychology-justice agenda 
and, as such, support an integrity-oriented morality.  In what follows, key practices 
stemming from these three PJ principles are applied to the dilemma of psychiatrically Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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disordered prisoners and solitary confinement.  The aim of this exposition is to provisionally 
delineate an alternative ethic to juridical decision-making that meaningfully endeavors to 
reconnect offenders, their victims, and the communities that bind them, in ways that enable 
excellence in character for all.     
As noted previously, therapeutic jurisprudence draws “attention [to] the emotional 
well-being of those who come into contact with law and the legal system” (Winick, 2007, p. 
1; see also Winick & Wexler, 2003, 2006).  Thus, its practice relies on the role that the 
actors within the system (e.g., judges, attorneys) can assume so that they can act 
therapeutically.  As Winick (2007) suggested, “when consistent with other justice values, 
the law‟s potential for increasing emotional well-being of the individual and society as a 
whole will be increased” (p. 1).  Indeed, as he and his colleague Wexler asserted, the 
current criminal justice system is antitherapeutic in nature and engenders harm (2006, pp. 
605-606).   
In order to maximize the potential for salubrious outcomes, an ethic of care must be 
adopted (Winick & Wexler, 2006).  Care ethics emphasizes “relationships, situational and 
contextual factors, and the unique needs and interests of affected parties as key 
considerations in the face of conflicts and dilemmas” (Williams & Arrigo, 2008, p. 262).  This 
approach requires jurists to embody a “judge-as-counselor” role and to “know the 
defendant, consider her or his life circumstances and motives, and take these into 
consideration when making a ruling” (Williams & Arrigo, 2008, p. 265; see also Strang & 
Braithwaite, 2001; Winick & Wexler, 2006).  By doing so, virtues such as empathy, 
benevolence, and tolerance supersede the need to weigh competing interests or rigidly 
uphold duties that could subsequently result in greater injury (Bernstein & Gilligan, 1990; 
Noddings, 2003). Thus, this care ethic “is a form of substantive justice” in which legal 
decision-brokers “cultivate a sense of otherness” (Arrigo & Milovanovic, 2009, p. 69).  Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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When practiced as described above, therapeutic jurisprudence makes salubrious 
outcomes possible for psychiatrically disordered offenders (Wexler, 2008).  To ensure that 
judges and attorneys have the skills necessary to respond appropriately to mentally ill 
prisoners, psychologists of law must provide counseling advice and clinical training to justice 
professionals (Winick & Wexler, 2003).  Under these conditions, an approach based on the 
insights of therapeutic jurisprudence yields a response to harm absent the prescribed 
punitive confinement resolution. Instead, its care ethic stresses a “readiness for 
rehabilitation” (Wexler, 2008, p. 169) as a more effective way to address the emotional 
needs of the mentally ill incarcerate.  In this way, the offender is afforded an increased 
opportunity to develop moral character so vital to curbing persistent criminal behavior that 
often leads to prison management concerns, at times resulting in protracted placement in a 
solitary confinement unit.  
  As Hancock and Sharp (2004) noted, “It is important to bear in mind that penal 
sanctions, like crimes, are intended harms” (p. 398).  Thus, as opposed to a strictly 
retributive response to crime, restorative justice seeks to acknowledge the injury resulting 
from an offense and, essentially, to repair those individuals affected by it.  Its practice is to 
challenge the “character of justice” as delineated by the State (Bayley, 2001, p. 211).  In 
other words, a restorative strategy contests the legal system‟s prescription of how and for 
whom justice is served.  Moreover, as Bayley asserted, the perception of justice advanced 
by an organized society‟s legal edifice is one in which attorneys stand guard, codified rules 
instruct judges and juries on determining a defendant‟s guilt or innocence, and an appeal is 
a reasonable avenue through which those alleging a wrongful conviction have recourse 
(2001, p. 211).  However, while the system is consumed with preserving a “just order,” 
restorative justice enables a community to nurture a “just peace” (Strang & Braithwaite, 
2001, p. 14; cf., Arrigo & Milovanovic, 2009, pp. 42-44).  In other words, it endeavors not 
only to heal the relationship between the offender and victim, but also to reinstate the Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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moral equilibrium of a community (Braswell et al., 2001, p. 141; see also Sullivan & Tifft, 
2005; Van Ness & Heetdirks Strong, 2007).  As Quinney (1991) noted: 
“crime is suffering and…the ending of crime is possible only with the ending of 
suffering.  And the ending both of suffering and of crime, which is the establishing of 
justice, can come only out of peace, out of a peace that is spiritually grounded in our 
very being.  To eliminate crime – to end the construction and perpetuation of an 
existence that makes crime possible – requires a transformation of our human being” 
(pp. 11-12). 
In contrast to restoration, the current response to crime leaves psychiatrically 
disordered inmates feeling “alienated, more damaged, disrespected, disempowered, less 
safe and less cooperative with society” (Braswell et al, 2001, p. 142; see also Christie, 
1981).  This is particularly problematic for such offenders. Not only are they isolated socially 
(and, at times, physically) from others, they effectively feel detached from the dynamics of 
their own being as their mental states fluctuate or progressively deteriorate beyond their 
control (Arrigo, 2002b; Haney, 2003; Rhodes, 2004).  Thus, rather than further disaffecting 
and stigmatizing incarcerates with (preexisting) mental health issues, restorative justice 
offers a pro-social alternative.
20  Further, as Van Ness and Heetdirks Strong (2007) noted, 
engaging offenders in healing efforts may also encourage the community to become more 
active in determining and abating some of the social and economic barriers that contribute 
to (neighborhood) criminality.  In this respect, then, the needs of psychologically disordered 
individuals, those they injure, and the milieus they all inhabit are more completely 
addressed.  
Commenting on the relationship between restorative and community justice, Presser 
(2004, p. 105) remarked:  “Crime fundamentally silences, justice gives voice.”  Thus, 
commonsense justice, as described and advocated by Finkel (1995), seeks to inject public 
sentiment into the juridical decision-making process.  Offenders with psychological health Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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conditions are often presented in court as dangerous and irascible, warranting confinement 
and sometimes placement in an isolation unit or a supermax facility.  Without question, 
untreated mental disorders can facilitate risk-taking and violent behavior, deeply affecting 
the ability of those afflicted to conform to societal and institutional rules.  However, a PJ 
approach informed by the logic of commonsense justice offers a considerable remedy.  
Where restorative justice endeavors to dialogically connect the offender, the offended, and 
their community, commonsense justice encourages all parties in dispute to adopt a 
resolution that they deem fair and just (Finkel 1997, 2000).    
  Indeed, through interventions such as victim-offender mediation, restorative justice 
provides a critical opportunity for all aggrieved citizens to heal through an interactive and 
reparative exchange where felt harm is voiced candidly, where lived injury is acknowledged 
remorsefully, and where this mutuality is embraced respectfully, mercifully, and forgivingly 
(Arrigo & Schehr, 1998; Braithwaite, 2002; Presser, 2004).  This healing dialogue, when 
guided by public sentiment that re-engages “the conscience of the community” (Sellers & 
Arrigo, 2009 p. 480), challenges the necessity for retributive responses such as solitary 
confinement. Instead, as an integrative and applied expression of psychological 
jurisprudence steeped in the moral philosophy of virtue, commonsense justice as proposed 
here enables legal tribunals to render decisions that are as salubrious as they are 
reparative; that are as fair-minded as they are empathic. 
  Efforts to translate theory into meaningful public policy undoubtedly are challenging.  
While retributive responses remain the prescribed recourse, the question lingers whether 
something more salutary in nature can be done for offenders with mental health conditions 
serving time in long-term disciplinary solitary confinement.  Along these lines, the preamble 
to the 19
th century Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons 
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“When we reflect upon the miseries [seen in prisons]…it becomes us to extend our 
compassion to that part of mankind, who are the subjects of these miseries.  By the 
aids of humanity, their undue and illegal sufferings may be prevented…and such 
degrees and modes of punishment may be discovered and suggested, as may, 
instead of continuing habits of vice, become the means of restoring our fellow 
creatures to virtue and happiness”  (Vaux, 1826 as cited in Craig, 2004, p. 938).    
  When reviewing law and psychology matters such as inmate mental health and 
solitary confinement, the legal reasoning employed by the courts demands critical 
reexamination.  As demonstrated by this qualitative study, the jurisprudential intent 
discernable through the courts‟ decision-making conveys an unmistakable reliance on 
utilitarianism and Kantian formalism.  The prevailing case law aspires to achieve a “greater 
good” in which the interests of society (and its correctional apparatus) supersede the 
mental health concerns of prisoners in prolonged punitive isolation. Moreover, the bench 
perceives an obligation to uphold a particular duty (e.g., deference to prison managers), 
rather than to thoughtfully consider those circumstances that led incarcerates to raise 
Eighth Amendment challenges regarding their confinement.  However, as provisionally 
delineated, something more can and should be done to effectively address the distinct 
needs of society and psychiatrically disordered offenders.   
Developed within the law, psychology, and justice tradition, as well as the theorizing 
of psychological jurisprudence, an alternative policy-based agenda was proposed. 
Collectively, the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence, restorative justice, and 
commonsense justice (including their assorted practices) are consistent with Aristotelian 
ethics.  This moral philosophy seeks to grow character so that citizens can lead lives of 
excellence.  Accordingly, legal tribunals are encouraged to incorporate virtue-based 
reasoning into their judicial rulings. Moreover, courts are reminded that when they promote 
such flourishing, all parties affected by harm benefit:  the possibility of recovery and Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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transformation thrives. This is how healing is promoted and justice is achieved for 
individuals and within institutions by a society that affirms, indeed celebrates, the 
unrealized potential of both.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
1 Additionally, the logic of psychological jurisprudence and the philosophy of ethics conveyed 
through the  
judicial opinions on disciplinary solitary confinement and incarcerates without preexisting 
psychiatric  
disorders has yet to be explored.  The prevailing research suggests that the risks of placing 
these inmates in isolation are, most assuredly, serious.  However, the extant literature 
overwhelmingly demonstrates that confining mentally ill prisoners in punitive segregation is 
acutely devastating.  Nevertheless, future research regarding the former offender group 
(those without preexisting mental health conditions) is both undeniably worthwhile and 
altogether necessary.  
 
2 A literature base exists that explores the ethics of solitary confinement from the academic 
(Kleinig & Smith, 2001; Lippke, 2004; Schwartz, 2003), the programmatic (Shalev, 2008), 
and the correctional practice (American Psychological Association, 2003; Bonner & 
Vandecreek, 2006)  perspectives.  However, the purpose of this study is to examine the 
moral reasoning that informs the courts‟ decisions on long-term disciplinary isolation.  As 
such, dialogue involving the ethical practice of solitary confinement is not germane to the 
ensuing inquiry. 
 
3 Early empirical research is also useful to the ensuing analysis.  For example, a study by 
Toch (2003) examined data from the mid-nineteenth century identifying the effects of 
solitary confinement on prisoners.  Among the accounts he assessed was a report prepared 
in 1845 by Dr. Thomas Cleveland who indicated that 25% of inmates kept in solitary 
confinement “manifested decided symptoms of derangement” (p. 223).  In addition to his 
empirical findings, Dr. Cleveland included written observations of prisoners who were placed 
in solitary confinement: Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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“Now, suddenly abstract from a man these senses, to which he has been so long 
accustomed; shut him up…in a solitary cell, where he must pass the same unvarying 
round, from week to week, with hope depressed, with no subjects for reflection but 
those which give him pain to review, in the scenes of his former life; after a few 
days, with no new impressions made upon his senses…one unvarying sameness 
relaxes the attention and concentration of his mind, and it will not be thought 
strange, that, through the consequent dibility and irritability of its organ, the mind 
should wander and become impaired”  (Gray, 1847/1973 as cited in Toch, 2003, p. 
223). 
 
4 It is important to note that, like the general prison population, those placed in long-term 
solitary confinement disproportionately represent economically disadvantaged individuals.  
Further, research indicates that the deleterious effects of extended isolation are perhaps 
uniquely harmful to women (Arrigo & Bullock, 2008).  For example, Shaylor‟s (1998) study 
at the SHU at Valley State Prison for Women in Chowchilla, California described how female 
incarcerates are more vulnerable to sexual harassment and abuse by male prison guards.  
Cell extractions performed with force, common in long-term solitary confinement, may also 
trigger post-traumatic episodes in women who have experienced violent sexual assaults in 
their past.  For an overview of the mental health issues women confront, especially while 
confined see, Gido and Dalley (2009).  
 
5 In Ruiz v. Johnson, the court considered the extant research on the adverse psychological 
consequences of placing prisoners with preexisting mental health conditions in long-term 
administrative segregation.  Acknowledging the deleterious effects of such confinement, the 
court ruled that exposing mentally ill inmates to extended isolation violated the Eighth 
Amendment‟s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  See Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. 
Supp. 855 (1999).  
 
6 Citing the extant literature, two landmark cases established an Eighth Amendment 
violation regarding prisoners with preexisting mental health conditions in long-term 
disciplinary segregation.  In Madrid v. Gomez and Jones ’El v. Berge, the court determined 
that placing inmates with such disorders in isolation constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.  See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1995) and Jones ‘El v. 
Berge, 164 F.Supp.2d 1096 (2001). 
 
7 In the past, prisoners in the United States were considered “slaves of the State” and, as 
such, had no constitutional rights.  Beginning with the prison reform movement in the 
1960s, the courts began to acknowledge that these protections extended to inmates.  Even 
with this recognition, the courts largely maintain a “hands-off” approach to cases involving 
incarcerated offenders.  As Weidman noted, “Concerns about separation of powers, 
federalism, and courts' lack of expertise in prison management [are] sometimes cited in 
support of this position”  (2004, p. 3). 
 
8 The methodology focuses on ascertaining prevailing case law and analyzing the extant 
legal history.  The methodology describes how the prevailing case law was determined.  The 
extant legal history refers to the most fully developed statements on disciplinary long-term 
solitary confinement for prisoners with preexisting psychiatric disorders as rendered by the 
courts.  This latter strategy entails selecting those judicial opinions, guided by the identified 
qualitative methodology, that advance jurisprudential knowledge of the psycho-legal 
problem under consideration.  Thus, the stipulated methodology (i.e., Lexis/Nexis search 
followed by two levels of textual analysis) is complemented by evaluating the evolution of Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
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the correctional law in this area.  Presenting the most fully developed statements 
concerning protracted and punitive solitary confinement for mentally ill inmates, is not 
governed by appellate court decision-making wherein a contraction or dimunition of the law 
is subsequently delineated.  All cases chosen for review were guided by the logic of both 
research strategies. For more on this complementary strategy of capturing the most 
advanced legal history in relation to the present inquiry, compare, for example, Goff v. 
Harper (1997) and Goff v. Harper (1999).  In 1997, the trial court determined four 
constitutional violations and, in rendering its decision, ordered a remedial plan.  The 
subsequent review in 1999 involved an evaluation of the Iowa State Penitentiary‟s efforts to 
correct the violations.  Thus, Goff v. Harper (1997) more fully captures the court‟s 
statement on long-term disciplinary solitary confinement and the Eighth Amendment.  For 
more on qualitatively analyzing the evolution of a cognate area of mental health law, see 
Arrigo (1993, 2002b).    
  
 
9 The Supreme Court has delineated a two-prong test by which the courts must assess 
violation of Eighth Amendment claims.  To satisfy the objective requirement of the test, 
courts must “assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be 
so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to 
such a risk.  In others words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is 
not one that today‟s society chooses to tolerate”  (Helling  v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 
(1993)).  To meet the subjective requirement, the prisoner must prove that an individual 
acted with “deliberate indifference” to an inmate‟s health or safety if he is aware that the 
prisoner will face a risk of serious harm and fails to acknowledge or avert it.  Interestingly, 
although the Court established this standard, it failed to distinguish what “contemporary 
standards of decency” are or to provide specific insight into how the analysis should be 
conducted  (Fellner, 2006). 
 
10 In Farmer v. Brennan (1994), the Supreme Court employed the two-prong test for 
determining if a preoperative transsexual inmate‟s Eighth Amendment protection against 
cruel and unusual punishment had been violated when the prisoner was placed in 
segregation.  Farmer raised the challenge based on the conditions of the confinement being 
so volatile that they placed him (as Farmer is referred to in the court‟s language) at risk of 
being sexually assaulted.  In Rhodes v. Chapman (1981), the Court heard arguments 
relating to double ceiling inmates in segregation.  In delivering their opinion, the Court 
noted that the Constitution does not guarantee a comfortable prison environment.  The 
Court gave deference to the legislature and prison administrators in their responsibility to 
implement and oversee correctional institution policies and procedures.  See Farmer v. 
Brennan 511 U.S. 825 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).  
 
11 The extant social science and law review literature offers insight into why prisoners in 
solitary confinement – including those with and without preexisting mental health conditions 
– fail to succeed on Eighth Amendment violation claims.  Indeed, a significant number of 
cases are either dismissed or proceed on another claim, such as Due Process  (Fellner, 
2006; Haney, 2003; Haney & Lynch, 1997; Perlin & Dlugacz, 2008; Weidman, 2004).  Some 
researchers point to the difficulty of overcoming the two-prong test, in which the harm to be 
considered is traditionally interpreted by the court to mean one that is corporeal in nature  
(Haney & Lynch, 1997; Perlin & Dlugacz, 2008; Romano, 1996; Weidman, 2004).  As such, 
many inmates are unable to successfully associate their psychological harm to that of 
physical injury.  Others assert that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), passed by 
Congress in 1996, has hindered cases in which prisoners are seeking relief.  Under the 
PLRA, correctional administrators are exempt from judicial supervision in most cases and 
when relief is granted, it becomes ineffective after two years  (Lobel, 2008; Perlin & Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Criminology    Inmate Mental Health & Solitary Confinement 
Special Edition Vol 1, Nov, 2010: pp. 1-82                     Bersot & Arrigo 
 
66 
 
Dlugacz, 2008; Rebman, 1999; Weidman, 2004).  Further, inmates incarcerated at 
Supermax facilities face a particularly difficult hurdle to overcome.  As the Madrid court 
poignantly noted, “a challenge to supermax incarceration is not a case about inadequate or 
deteriorating physical conditions.  There are no rat-infested cells, antiquated buildings, or 
unsanitary supplies…it is a case about "a prison of the future."  (Weidman, 2004, p. 7; see 
also Lobel, 2008).    
 
12 Interestingly, the social science and law review literature indicates that the conditions at 
issue in Ruiz v. Johnson (1999) were similar in nature to those found within punitive solitary 
confinement (Haney, 2003; Harvard Law Review, 2008; Perlin & Dlugacz, 2008; Weidman, 
2004).  However, the present study examines only those cases involving confinement 
conditions formally classified as disciplinary segregation.  Clearly, a subsequent study 
exploring administrative solitary confinement case law would be worthwhile. 
 
13 The Vasquez case differs slightly from the other cases comprising the data set.   In this 
instance, a psychiatrically disordered inmate raised an Eighth Amendment violation claim 
asserting that specific conditions, including constant illumination and poor ventilation, in 
long-term disciplinary isolation exacerbated his mental illness.  Although the Vasquez court 
did not consider the totality of the conditions of isolation, the case was deemed appropriate 
for inclusion based on a twofold rationale.  First, the conditions, constant illumination and 
insufficient ventilation (e.g., heating, cooling, and lack of access to fresh air), are featured 
prominently in solitary confinement facilities.  Second, the deleterious effects of these 
environmental factors, among others, on the mental well-being of inmates are noted in the 
social science and law review literature (Cohen, 2008; Haney, 2003; McConville & Kelly, 
2007; Rebman, 1999; Toch, 2003).  
  
14 Admittedly, some of the cases comprising the data set have lengthy procedural histories 
and differing statuses.  However, for the purpose of this qualitative endeavor, only those 
judicial decisions that most thoroughly captured the courts‟ statements on psychiatrically 
disordered inmates, prolonged disciplinary segregation, and the Eighth Amendment were 
included.  Additionally, it is imperative to acknowledge the distinction between the type of 
review that occurs in a trial court versus an appellate court.  Trial courts hear evidence and 
determine findings of fact.  In contrast, appellate courts assess substantive or procedural 
errors occurring in the trial court‟s judicial decision-making.  Although mindful that the 
method of review employed by the respective courts differs, this is not the source of 
analysis for the ensuing inquiry.  Rather, the focus of this study is to examine the meaning 
conveyed by the courts‟ rhetoric (i.e., the jurisprudential intent and the moral reasoning 
that informs it) in the precedent setting or prevailing cases on these matters.   
 
15The six judicial decisions selected for critical examination did not include any dissenting 
opinions.  Consequently, the majority opinions were analyzed in order to obtain data 
appropriate for the two levels of analysis employed in the ensuing inquiry.    
 
16 To be clear, discerning the underlying moral philosophy of a legal case by examining its 
jurispruential intent, understood as manifest content, represents an exercise in interpretive 
reasoning.  In other words, this is not a precise process of data finding; rather, it is a more 
heuristic, though cleary systematic, meaning-making endeavor.  The method‟s conviction is 
that “it is possible to go beyond the surface meaning of legal texts [manifest content] to 
explore the structure and the ideological content… [and in doing so] to searh for the values 
expressed by the law (Mercuro & Medema, 1998, p. 169).      
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17 The application of level 2 analysis did not yield textual exegeses regarding the moral 
philosophy in the Vasquez v. Frank (2006) decision.  Accordingly, the following discussion 
focuses on the results from the remaining five cases.  
 
18 There are two clear limitations that must be acknowledged when utilizing a self-report 
survey instrument to gather data.  An instrument designed to elicit the ethical reasoning 
employed by judges is particularly problematic in that moral attitudes are often complex 
and, as such, are not easily interpreted.  Moreover, given their obligation to remain neutral 
arbiters of the law, judges may not be forthcoming in their responses.  
 
 
 
19 Given the harsh conditions of long-term disciplinary solitary confinement, a number of 
leading domestic and international researchers as well as human rights activists advocate 
the abolition of its use within American correctional institutions.  Abolitionist proponents 
assert that isolative confinement, of any type or duration, is psychologically devastating to 
both inmates with and without preexisting mental health conditions (Fellner, 2006; Lobel, 
2008; Rhodes, 2005).  Indeed, according to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
“prolonged isolation and coercive solitary confinement are, in themselves, cruel and 
inhuman treatments, damaging to the person‟s psychic and moral integrity” (Lobel, 2008, p. 
123). 
 
20 Efforts to implement the principles and practices of restorative justice within the 
correctional system have been preliminarily undertaken with the inclusion of conflict 
resolution and victim empathy programs (Johnstone & Van Ness, 2008; Liebmann & 
Braithwaite, 1999; Monahan et al., 2004).  However, the application of restorative justice 
within the penal system has been a source of debate.  Advocates argue that it reduces 
instances of prison violence and encourages offenders to emotionally connect with their 
victims (Blad, 2003; Coyle, 2001). However, critics assert that restorative efforts in 
correctional institutions “distract the public and policy-makers from the bankruptcy of 
prisons” and only serve to legitimize imprisonment (Roberts & Peters, 2003, p. 116). 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Level I Analysis:  Underlying Jurisprudential Intent 
 
  Madrid v. 
Gomez 
Scarver v. 
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Torres et al. 
v. Comm’r of 
Corr. et al. 
1  No prison 
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the design 
of measures 
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controlling 
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maniacs 
without 
exacerbating 
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manias.  It 
“Supermax is 
known to 
cause 
psychiatric 
morbidity, 
disability, 
suffering, 
and 
mortality” 
Court‟s job 
is to 
identify 
Eighth 
Amendment 
violations 
and show 
deference 
to officials 
in their role 
as prison 
managers 
Conditions 
exacerbated 
Vasquez‟s 
mental 
health 
condition, 
but prison 
officials 
refused to 
lessen their 
impact 
Court 
determines 
whether 
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is a delicate 
balance” 
 
2  Prison 
officials are 
“entitled to 
design and 
operate the 
SHU 
consistent 
with the 
penal 
philosophy of 
their 
choosing, 
absent 
constitutional 
violations” 
 
Inmates like 
Scarver, 
who are 
already 
serving a life 
sentence, 
are 
undeterrable 
Supermax 
was built to 
house 
recalcitrant 
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mentally ill 
prisoners 
cannot 
conform their 
behavior 
Court could 
have taken 
a “hands-
off” position 
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officials 
violate the 
Eighth 
Amendment 
when they 
deliberately 
ignore an 
inmate‟s 
mental 
health 
condition 
Conditions 
must put 
inmates at a 
substantial risk 
of harm and 
prison officials 
must be 
deliberately 
indifferent to 
this risk 
3  Conditions 
may be 
harsher than 
necessary to 
house 
mentally ill 
inmates, but 
deference 
must be 
given to 
prison 
officials 
 
Federal 
courts must 
not tell a 
state how to 
“run its 
prison 
system” 
The PLRA 
limits the 
scope of 
injunctive 
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conditions 
can lead to 
mental 
deterioration 
The 
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are not 
cruel and 
unusual, 
but the 
prison 
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were 
deliberately 
indifferent 
to those 
with 
preexisting 
mental 
health 
conditions 
Although 
Vasquez 
has been 
released 
from 
segregation, 
he may still 
be entitled 
to damages 
Isolation is not 
unconstitutional 
4  Prison 
officials were 
aware that a 
number of 
inmates are 
mentally ill 
and such 
conditions 
could 
exacerbate 
their 
preexisting 
conditions 
 
The 
Constitution 
is unclear on 
prison 
conditions; 
treating a 
mentally ill 
inmate is 
complicated 
Many of the 
conditions 
serve no 
penological 
purpose 
The needs 
of mentally 
ill inmates 
are not 
being met 
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officials 
were aware 
of 
Vasquez‟s 
adverse 
reactions to 
the 
conditions 
Dr. Grassian 
opined that 
such conditions 
can case 
mental harm 
and 
deterioration 
5  Current 
staffing 
“Maybe 
there is 
“mentally ill 
inmates do 
There is 
“great 
No Data 
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levels are 
not sufficient 
to respond to 
prisoners 
exhibiting 
signs of 
mental 
deterioration 
 
some well-
known 
protocol for 
dealing with 
the Scarvers 
of this 
world, 
though 
probably 
there is not 
” 
not have 
access to the 
programming 
because they 
are not able 
to control 
their 
behavior to 
reach higher 
levels” 
demand for 
a special 
needs 
program” 
6  Conditions 
may hover 
above what 
is humanly 
tolerable, 
particularly 
for mentally 
ill inmates 
 
 
 
 
 
Court must 
seek to 
protect 
inmates, 
guards, and 
Scarver 
from himself 
“Balancing of 
harms” in 
which 
mentally ill 
prisoners are 
protected 
from being 
placed in 
segregation, 
but prison 
officials are 
not 
overburdened 
logistically or 
financially 
Mentally ill 
prisons 
have 
serious 
health 
needs 
which are 
unlikely to 
be 
addressed 
by officials 
Vasquez 
may 
proceed on 
Eighth 
Amendment 
claims 
No Data 
Ascertained 
7  Prisoners are 
“still fellow 
human 
beings…most 
of whom will 
one day 
return to 
society… 
[and] have 
nonetheless, 
a human 
dignity” 
No Data 
Ascertained 
“…the public 
interest will 
be served by 
protecting 
the Eighth 
Amendment 
rights of 
inmates 
housed at 
Supermax” 
No Data 
Ascertained 
No Data 
Ascertained 
No Data 
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Consequentialism 
(Utilitarianism) 
 
 
Formalism 
(Kantian Ethics) 
 
Virtue 
Ethics 
Madrid 
v. 
Gomez 
 
“Conditions may be harsher 
than necessary to 
accommodate the needs of 
the institution with respect to 
these populations.  However, 
giving defendants the wide-
ranging deference they are 
owed in these matters, we 
can not say that the 
conditions overall lack any 
penological justification” 
“duty and responsibility of 
this Court to ensure that 
constitutional rights are 
fully vindicated” 
“prisoners…have, 
nonetheless, a human 
dignity” 
“duty to assume some 
responsibility for his safety 
and general well being” 
“must ensure that 
prisons…do not degenerate 
into places that violate 
basic standards of decency 
and humanity” 
 
 
Scarver 
v. 
Litscher 
 
 
“Prison authorities must be 
given considerable latitude in 
the design of measures for 
controlling homicidal maniacs 
without exacerbating their 
manias.  It is a delicate 
balance” 
“protect other inmates or 
guards from Scarver or 
Scarver from himself” 
   
 
Jones ‘El 
v. Berge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“balancing of harms” 
“court interferes in the 
management of Supermax to 
a minimal degree yet casts 
the net wide enough to catch 
any seriously mentally ill 
inmates”  
“public interest is not served 
by housing seriously 
mentally ill inmates at 
Supermax” 
“public interest will be served 
by protecting the Eighth 
Amendment rights” 
“the potential harm to yet 
unidentified seriously 
mentally ill inmates is just as 
detrimental as to those who 
have already been identified” 
 
“defendants should be 
afforded due deference” 
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Goff v. 
Harper 
“serve justice with a 
minimum of judicial 
intervention and provide 
prison officials with the 
maximum possible 
discretion” 
“court's duty [is] to 
determine "whether a 
challenged punishment 
comports with human 
dignity” 
“courts owe great deference 
to officials” 
“Court's job is only to 
identify constitutional 
violations” 
 
 
 
Torres 
et al. v. 
Comm’r 
Corr. et 
al. 
“conditions…more restrictive 
than those in DDU did not 
offend the Eighth 
Amendment because its 
inmates were provided 
adequate food, clothing, 
sanitation, medical care, and 
communication with others” 
 
“an Eighth Amendment 
violation, is a purely legal 
determination for the court 
to make” 
 
 
 